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INTRODUCTION
Colombia is now facing a situation of great uncertainty, after over a year of
having signed the 2016 peace accords that put an end to the longest armed conflict in
Latin America. The current President Juan Manuel Santos' administration is struggling
with passing as many laws through Congress in order to guarantee the fulfillment of the
terms agreed with the former guerrilla group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) before the next presidential elections in May of 2018. The Colombian peace
process has had to face several challenges. Starting from 1989, Colombia has gone
through seven peace processes and failed to follow through all of them except for this last
one. The fact of the matter is that all through these previous processes, there was
insufficient political will and consensus for settling the armed conflict towards a long
lasting peace. It was the deeply ingrained rural roots of the conflict, combined with the
historic political opposition to change in the status quo and the lack of public support,
that got in the way of ending a reality that caused so much harm to the Colombian society
and economy.
Today, we see a concern about whether the substance of the peace process truly
addresses the needs of all the stakeholders involved; perspectives on the achievements of
this peace process vary depending on the actor responding to this question. Factors like
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an accountable judicial system, guarantees of reparation to victims of the conflict,
redistribution of the land, effective handling of illicit drug activities and the need for the
Colombian society to recognize the relevance of adapting to a new political and social
order {including demobilized members of the FARC), have challenged the Colombian
government's capabilities to prove their commitment and capabilities to follow through
on this peace process. The controversial nature of this peace process partly revolves
around the conservative opposition's interests regarding land, and a sense of justice
related to the political and social rights of the armed actors. While doing so, it leaves
aside the protection of those people living in rural areas who are in need of reparations,
security and an accountable judicial system to properly address their claims. The rural
areas still feel neglected by the government, and yet the Colombian government is trying
to solve a conflict that started because rural areas had to resort to violence to make their
claims heard while still neglecting these areas.
Therefore, it is of great relevance to diagnose the trajectory of the Colombian
peace process based on the willingness of the Colombian government to do what it
refused to do before, restructuring the democratic institutions into more inclusive ones,
addressing the issues of development in rural areas, and opening a dialogue based on a
political reality where civil society can be represented instead of the "delphinism"
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tradition (hereditary political power) that has ruled the country for centuries. The change
that a new Colombian society needs to see to achieve a long lasting peace is one that
includes those who have been excluded from the political agendas for centuries. This is
why this research is going to focus on the question of how civic engagement in the form
of grassroots movements is an effective transitional strategy to strengthen democratic
institutions and ultimately build a long lasting peace in the post-conflict context.
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Chapter I: Theoretical Frameworks on Post-Conffict State
Building and Intrinsic Challenges
Institutional Reform
There has been a common consensus regarding transitional post-conflict strategies
in societies. The general goal at the end of the conflict is immediately associated with the
establishment of democracy through participatory mechanisms in order to guarantee
stability leading to long lasting peace in the aftermath. Matthew Roddie and Caroline
Hartzell brought attention to the dynamics that had attempted to legitimize the resolution
of a conflict through democratic mechanisms. "The legitimacy of a new, postconflict
dispensation through electoral validation was essential."( Hoodie, M., Hartzell, C.
2010;2014, pp.9). However, post-conflict states have to face different challenges while
trying to achieve a stable democratic society.

In order to do so there must be a

reconstruction of the state, which has to adapt and comply with the terms of the peace
agreement, along with a new societal configuration involving the different actors of the
previous conflict that have to coexist peacefully. In this sense, democracy is not a regime
type that can be imposed, nor is it the only mechanism by which a government can claim
to be legitimate. Regardless of democratic practices talcing place, there is a need for
structural reforms before democracy can be legitimate. "Precisely because the prior
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regime has lost its legitimacy, there is no accepted legal or institutional framework that
can confer authority on a nascent government, no matter how democratically
constituted."(Lake.D, 2010;2014, pp.30) Furthermore, "the relative novelty and weakness
of state institutions in the postwar environment virtua11y assure that elections wi11 fail to
produce government leadership that the postwar population wi11 accept as legitimate"
(Hoodie, M., Hartzell, C. 2010;2014, pp.11 ).

Therefore institutional strengthening

through reform is a -key aspect of post-conflict state building.
When it comes to conflict resolution, the functionality and nature of the
institutions that facilitate and administer the post-conflict state is a topic of great
relevance. Hartzell recognizes that in the case of many Latin American civil wars,
"conflict can only be resolved if institutions exist to process or manage conflict. It is the
breakdown of these institutions or the violent efforts of some actors to reconfigure them
that lead to the outbreak of civil war" (Hartze11, 2010). The main actor's capacity of
building and maintaining conflict management institutions in the immediate aftermath of
the conflict, as wen as its flexibility to accommodate the needs of the people of a
post-conflict society, is relevant to this discussion. Institutional change must include the
interests of all actors involved in the conflict including rules of political inclusion,
extension of security guarantees to antagonists and victims, power sharing and rules
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regarding the structures that guarantee tools for justice and reparations to all actors (such
as a legal system or land reform).
The main issue regarding institutional reform is that all the actors must be
involved in this process. The process of institutional reform becomes a struggle for a
balance of interests that may create resistance to compromise instead of cohesive
compromises. On one hand there are "the strategic interactions of actors, most often
defined as political and economic elites, and the reasons they seek to define the rules of
the game as they do" (Hartzell, 2010). These actors try to resist significant change that
will imply a shift in the status quo upon which they have been benefiting. The main
points the conflict resolution efforts should address that are relevant to politico-economic
elites are the exercise of coercive force, political power, and economic resources. On the
other hand, the less powerful groups such as rural segments of civil society, including
indigenous people and afro-Colombian communities have to push their agenda to see an
institutional change that benefits their interests in the long term. The lack of power from
these actors comes from the historical lack of recognition from the government of these
groups as relevant actors in terms of representing their interest in the policy making
processes. This has led the government to utilize this lack of recognition of marginalized
groups and their association with a threat to national security as defined by the armed
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forces, to exclude them automatically from having a say in the institutions of government
to accomplish their agenda .
The incorporation of these three excluded groups, afro-Colombian, indigenous
and peasants, must be implemented to balance the outcome of the negotiations. The
negotiations of the terms of settling the armed conflict such as the Colombian peace
accords, as well as those regarding the "how" of the implementation of this agreement in
the transitional phase following the accords, must happen incrementally by all actors
involved. This is with the goal of making sure all actors are involved and to prevent old
elites from resisting large scale change. "Distributive issues are also likely to come to the
fore at the end of a civil war. In this instance, actors will seek to ensure that one group's
control and use of economic resources does not provide it with the means to threaten or
exclude others." (Hartzell, 20 I 0). In this sense, collective participation in reform making
processes are necessary to build solid institutions representing all parties' interests. We
see this in the cases of the FMLN in El Salvador, and other formerly armed groups in
Guatemala and Nicaragua, where the government addressed the former armed actor's
needs regarding unequal distribution of land at the stake of previous landowners.
However, it is important to recognize that even though these conflicts have similarities in
terms of involving armed actors, they have had fundamental differences in terms of
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length and intensity, involvement of external actors and the overall outcome in the
post-conflict context. The effective incorporation of all stakeholders has to do with the
previously mentioned variables, and it is important to recognize that outcomes will vary
among countries. The capability to reform the system comes from the entitlement and
power of a state to be able to do so. However "especially in the anarchy of a post-civil
war state, social order is a prerequisite for legitimate political authority. Rather than
writing constitutions and holding elections, state-builders need to demonstrate first that
they can restore order."( Lake, 2010;2014, pp.40)

Establishing a Legitimate Monopoly of Coercive Forces in the Context of Post-Conflict
David Lake has claimed that "the effective constitution of the institutions has to
go hand by hand with the reconstruction of both the state's monopoly of violence and the
legitimacy of that monopoly...In the anarchy that exists after an indecisive civil war or
where the international community has intervened to stop the killing, groups face the
enormously difficult task of rebuilding legitimacy in an environment of fear and
animosity." (Lake, 2010;2014, pp.30) The most immediate need of a transitioning society
is the need for order and security. In order for disarmament to happen, there needs to be a
mutual trust established between the armed actors and the government's military forces.
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And so the priority role of the transitional state must be to "'Protect people, defend
property, and adjudicate disputes... so citizens will increasingly perceive the new state as
legitimate and identify their own self-interest with the survival of the postwar
government" (Hoodie, M., Hartzell, C. 2010;2014, pp.I I ) The duty that corresponds to
the state as the only actor that can legitimately hold the monopoly of coercive violence
must be not only effectively fulfilled, but supported by the citizens themselves.
Institutional guarantees of security are vital in the sense that armed actors fear that once
they disarm, they might be attacked. On the other hand, the victims should also be
sheltered under the guarantee of non repetition, which is linked to protection from
emerging armed actors trying to fill power vacuums left by the former ones. In this
context, mistrust can be counterproductive to achieve negotiations and an agreement.
"Then the type of agreement between the government and the population should look like
a social contract where the government guarantees the people their basic needs and
security and the people in exchange comply with the norms dictated by it... legitimacy
follows from social order, not the other way around as in the current model." (Lake,
2010;20 I 4, pp.31 ). However, it is important to recognize that states are not always able to
maintain order and security while they are still trying to establish a new political and
social post-conflict framework.
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Foreign Intervention
"If societies cannot create legitimacy from within the state of nature themselves,
then some prior institution- in this case, the United Nations or some other international
body- must confer legitimacy on the newly constructed state." (Lake, 2010;2014, pp.36)
This intervention however, is another complexity in the process of settling the armed
conflict, since there is the risk that extreme-right elites often feel threatened to accept
foreign intervention due to the implications this brings to their status quo, as was the case
in El Salvador and Guatemala. In this area, international actors such as peacekeeping
forces might have a valuable transitional contribution to the settlement of a long lasting
peace while the state works to regain control of the legitimate monopoly of coercive
forces and establish social order. Prior to the 1990s, the peacekeeping strategy of the UN
consisted of addressing security concerns solely while trust among actors was established
in order to avoid the peace dialogues derailing. However, the nature of peacekeeping
operations changed dramatically to more "complex-multi dimensional institutions" that
focused on several tasks rather than just security enforcement. Boutros Boutros Ghali,
UN Secretary General in the key period at the end of the Cold War, expanded the UN
peacekeeping approach to include fostering economic and social cooperation to build
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trust among internal actors of the conflict, developing social and economic infrastructure,
and preventing the future return of violence. In fact "The strategies of restructuring
institutions and soft intervention share a common emphasis on establishing incentives for
individuals and groups to support a fragile peace and disincentivize from deflecting from
agreement" (Hoodie, M., Hartzell, C. 2010;2014, pp.5) Furthermore, the potential role of
soft intervention in the forms of providing targeted economic rewards to communities
supporting the process, legitimation of the state authorities, embargoes and sanctions to
non compliant states and delegitimization can help to lay the groundwork to organize the
anarchic dynamics and power vacuums left in the post-conflict context. One example of
this is the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and the Cease-Fire Commission in
countries like Mozambique (1992-94), as well as in specialized commissions dealing with
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

(DDR) processes to prevent former

armed actors from taking up weapons again and to sustain peace.
Soft-power intervention can also have its own drawbacks since "The international
financial institutions (IFls) that play a leading role in post conflict economic
reconstruction efforts instead consistently have favored a set of policies intended to
liberalize the economy and reduce the size and influence of government with the purpose
of opening the economy to foreign investment" (Hoodie, M., Hartzell, C. 2010;2014,
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pp.11 ). This economic liberalization became an incentive to the transnational companies
due to the potential extractive activities, and exploitation of the labor market in
post-conflict weak governments transformed them into one more actor whose agenda
generally conflicted with the less economically advantaged and less developed areas of
an already impoverished state. This becomes more evident since "economic liberalization
was typically not part of the formal mandate adopted by international organizations
overseeing the state-building mission, but was a universal policy usually grafted on by
international financial institutions as a condition for (often desperately needed)
development aid" ( Lake, 2010;2014, pp.33)

Establishment ofLegitimate Democratic Institutions

Another element of state building is introducing democratic institutions. For this
to be achieved, the infrastructure element that constitute elements that guarantee the
democratic practice in both, in its substantial as well as its procedural form. "In countries
emerging from civil war, however, democracy's "invitation to struggle" takes place in an
environment in which the norms of nonviolent dispute resolution are new and

12

governments typically lack the capacity to ensure that political competition remains
peaceful." (Hoodie, M., Hartzell, C. 2010;2014, pp.9) Political inclusion requires a
multidimensionality of trust among different actors, as well as trust in the system
structure where political decisions are going to be made. The contextual circumstances
under which the democratic elections happen have a significant impact on the further
development of the society. Contextual circumstances include the fact that the end of a
conflict does not mean the immediate transformation of a society, in fact, in order to
achieve a long lasting peace and strong democratic institutions there needs to be a strong
civil society. "Premature efforts to grow civil society may also make the peace more
fragile. In particular, when the state is not yet reconstituted as a unified authoritative
institution, but is cobbled together after a cease-fire as de facto jurisdictions awaiting a
final agreement on the issues of independence, the attempt to grow civil society will
foster attitudes and structures that further divide leaders and publics into separate
communities." (Roedger, 2010;2014, pp.53). Because institutional uncertainty is part of
the democratic process, there is room for all stakeholders to compete for their agenda.
Due to the fact that there is a conflict of interests among the different sectors of civil
society such as the private sector, the landowners, peasants, indigenous people,
afro-Colombian communities and the armed (or demobilized) forces, if there are no
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further means of communication and mediation among stakeholders, the consequence
will be a hostile environment. The civil society would be divided rather than unified
against bad government practices that allowed inequalities and the violations of their
rights. Ideally, the government outcomes should be the reflection of the participation of
the strong civil societies that support it. Strong, politically inclusive institutions are
necessary to avoid competition for the state's resources to legitimate the different rights
that different sectors of society claim.
An important mechanism to facilitate this inclusion is the representation of the
people's needs through an electoral democracy. However, building this political culture
and strong institutions is a process based on trust, which is built only by effective
compromises of an parties leading to inclusive policy making. The inclusiveness and
transparency of the government institutions are important to mediate interests and
represent the previously mentioned sectors of civil society. However, in its true form, the
development of a democratic political culture in Latin America has seemed to decrease,
leading groups of society to actively address their needs through their own means. In fact,
the Latin American Public Opinion Project has shown that the percentage representing
trust in the electoral system in Latin America has decreased by twenty two percent from
2004 to 2017 (LAPOP, 201 7). It is also important to recognize that in the case of
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Colombia, "only 24% of respondents report trust in elections, although elections have
been regularly certified as clean from fraud by international observers in recent years."
(LAPOP, 2017, pp. 15). This could be reflective of the weak democratic institutions in
Colombia, this could be due to the fact that even if the elections are certified as clean, the
political actions taken by the elected leaders does not lead to a significant change. This is
due to the need of the political elites in Colombia to preserve the status quo by not
making any significant reform.

Transformative Justice as a New Alternativefor Building a Long Lasting Peace
However, there is one more key factor among the theoretical frameworks of
conflict resolution analysis, that is the structural causes that caused the conflict to arise in
the first place and that remained embedded in the political and social context of the post
conflict society once the armed conflict has stopped. One of the main approaches to
building a long lasting peace is transitional justice, which according to the NGO the
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTn, refers to the ways governments
should approach the post-conflict to "address large scale or systematic human rights
violations so numerous and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to
provide an adequate response."(ICTJ, 2018) It is focused on the rights of the victims and
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accountability for the perpetrators of these large scale-structural abuses. This is where
transitional justice might not be as efficient as it is commonly thought, since "simply
becomes the instrument of a transition that legitimates a foundation of inequality and
injustice, and also undermines, or at least fails to empower, victims of past and future
injustices to pursue their rights." (Van der Merwe, H., Lykes, M., 2016, pp.362) due to its
emphasis on addressing the causes of them being victims rather than providing means for
them to transition to functional members of the civil society. Transitional justice is
temporary, but what happens to victims once this short term of transition passes, how
would a legal framework benefit them post-conflict? "The dominance of legalistic and
individualistic approaches in transitional justice has important limitations: continuing
asymmetries of social and economic power can render irrelevant the civil and political
rights (CPR) that transitional justice seeks to establish"( McGill, 2017, pp.80) Therefore
it is important to address structural violence from its major pillars: social marginalization,
political exclusion and economic exploitation. The point of restructuring a society implies
a reform from the roots of conflict, however transitional justice "mechanisms are related
to the "justice process" (2010: 39), strengthening the argument that transitional justice is
modelled on corrective criminal justice systems" (McGill,2017, pp.83). Transitional
justice may do a very good job of addressing direct violence such as holding human
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rights abusers accountable, establishing historical truth and arranging reparations to the
victims of the conflict. However, this assumes that the post-conflict institutions are stable
enough to provide judicial guarantees to the victims and provide appropriate means of
accountability.
These are not the causes of the conflict, but rather an immediate response to the
consequences. This is where it is relevant to recognize the differences between
transitional and a new transformative type of justice, which goes beyond the immediate
needs of the victims and transforms the basis for the post-conflict context differing from
the previous context of the conflict, so that structural patterns are not repeated.
"Transition can be seen as a bounded change in state to a known destination, capable of
being managed, transformation is a deeper and more uncertain process, often involving
cultural and behavioural change." (McGill, 201 7, pp.87). In this sense, a long lasting
peace needs to be tied to addressing structural violence, such as the fact that "Latin
American elites traditionally espouse a "modernising" rhetoric that denigrates indigenous
cultural identities and excludes indigenous (and African-descendent) populations from
political and economic power within society"( McGill, 2017, pp.81 ). Another example is
"widespread poverty, exploitation and inequalities across society. Access to
financial...structural violence is also seen in the systematic exclusion of certain groups
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from services and opportunities that are provided to others"( McGill, 2017, pp.82).
Evidence of this is the income inequality levels in Latin America, is reflected by the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations statement: "the Gini coefficient
(which measures inequality) applied to the distribution of land in the region as a whole
reaches 0.79, far surpassing Europe (0.57), Africa (0.56) and Asia (0.55).In South
America the inequality is even higher than the regional average (reaching a Gini
coefficient of 0.85), while in Central America it is slightly below the average, with a
coefficient of 0.75." (FAO, 2018). This is particularly relevant to explain the quality of
living of the people in the rural areas. The poverty and exclusion of the marginalized
groups of civil society in the rural areas can be reflected by the unequal agrarian
distribution since working the land has been their main mean of sustenance. Rather than
focusing on the government's agency in modifying the structures of inequality (such as
the agrarian system) like the ones addressed by transitional justice, transformative justice
"emphasizes the local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than
preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power
relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level"(McGill,
2017, pp.88)
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This is why transfonnational justice is a vital complement to the construction of
post-conflict institutions, since it focuses on engaging that civil society element that is so
necessary for the construction of democratic institutions. Transfonnative justice must
involve participation from local communities as active actors, designing policies and
practices in a way that is reflective of the local knowledge, understanding and manners of
working. Once there is a structured framework of solutions provided by the locals, with
the help of wen functioning institutions, "Transfonnative institutions must exemplify the
values they seek to promote rather than simply reflect the existing balance of power
within society" McGill, 2017, pp.89). However when applying this concept in practice, it
is possible to see how it is precisely the absent voice of the local communities, due to the
government's neglect, that restrains transfonnational justice from operating. There is a
need to promote participation by marginalized groups, as designers, as data coHectors and
report writers to be able to advocate for their needs, based on factual data "to participate
and allow truth commissions to "set political agendas for future social justice refonns
aimed at true conflict prevention"(McGill, 2017, pp.96}
From this point of view, it is possible to see how transfonnative justice succeeds
m
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complementing transitional justice, in the sense that it involves significant participation
by local communities as active agents designing policies and practices in a manner that is
intrinsic to the least advantaged (who are also the most affected areas by conflict) sectors
of population removing cultural, financial or social barriers to meaningful inclusion. It
provides a sense of agency to the marginalized communities to rebuild the post-conflict
context that directly affects them, while the transitional justice mechanisms take care of
the immediate legal side of the institutions and provide reparations to the victims. This
will help to rebuild the relationship between the state and marginalized communities,
contributing to a potential engagement on the democratic political culture. Lastly, it is
important to recognize that the civil engagement of the marginalized communities by the
government may not happen immediately. The communal efforts towards building an
inclusive political culture cannot be one sided. Transformative justice must be supported
by the government institutions to reinforce a structural change by addressing the local
agendas. The relevance of the government's role in supporting the transformative efforts
is going to be described in Chapter Five, which focuses on the case studies of the
communities of San Carlos in Antioquia compared to the marginalized communities in
Buenaventura.
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CHAPTER II: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICAN PEACE PROCESSES

Integral Approach to Conflict Resolution in Latin America

Having evaluated the extent in which transitional and transfonnative justice may
offer a good conflict resolution strategy, it is also relevant to understand by which
mechanisms these two approaches can be materialized. On the one hand, transitional
justice offers a solution mostly from a legal-judiciary approach. Transfonnative justice on
the other hand, requires a more radical refonn of the structural injustices that gave birth
to and prolong the conflict. Without the development of an effective binding legal
framework that allows refonn, the socio-economic structures of the post-conflict society
will remain unattended. However, even before developing refonnative legislations, it is
important to identify the specific key areas of development that significantly impact the
construction of a long-lasting peace. In this sense, the legal refonn can be fonnulated to
avoid ambiguities that might give place to deviation from the original goals by the parties
that are threatened by these refonns.
Preti offers a "multifaceted" approach to handle refonns regarding post conflict
society. This approach recognizes the different levels under which violence takes place in
order to identify the most effective measurements to address it. Preti's interpretation of
violence comes from Galtung's framing of violence as "avoidable insults to basic human
needs, more generally to life, lowering the real level of need satisfaction below wat is
potentially possible" (Preti, 2002, pp. I 00). He classifies violence into three categories:
direct (mental or physical), structural or indirect (built in economic and political
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structures causing an unequal distribution of power and resources), and cultural
(religious, ideology, language, art, that can be used to legitimize structural violence). An
ideal post conflict state would be a state of peaceful cooperation rather than lack of armed
violence. The main element of achieving peace through cooperation consists in the
capability of the negotiating parties to understand that "what is rational (or irrational) for
society as a whole, and what is rational (or irrational) for groups or individuals within
that society. Processes that are dysfunctional for the majority of people may nevertheless
be functional for a few"(Preti, 2002, pp.102). In this sense, we can understand the
rational argument behind the use of violence by different actors. This argument has two
main components, the relationship between the structure and those who take on the
actions that prolong violence. The problem and its causes must not be dissociated from its
function. An example of this is the juxtaposition between the root causes of the conflict,
and the reason why it has been prolonged.
Preti found an intersection between the political economy approach and structural
violence approach to the conflict, which incorporates the functions of violence within
groups in its approach to root causes of the conflict while respecting cultural and political
specific situations for each country. The first approach is the interaction between actors
and structure of violence (government, local guerrilla institutions, local resistance groups,
etc.) by understanding how these agendas combine and strengthen a particular economic
and social system of power and profit. The second is interaction between functions and
causes of the conflict. When it comes to historic or structural roots of the conflict, we
look at political and economic inequality, social exclusion and cultural discrimination.
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However, these structures can also serve a specific function for the elites to defend their
status quo.

The Structural and Political Economic Factors of the Guatemalan Peace Process:
Comparative Lessons

By using this type of analysis in the Guatemalan case, the first step to take is
understanding the historical roots of the conflict. The UN-sponsored Commission for
Historical Clarification {CEH) and the Catholic Church Human Rights Office (ODHA)
were two main institutions that took the role of recording the political and social causes
of the conflict in the form of testimonies. The Catholic Church focused more on the
victims • testimonies, while the ODHA focused more the historical causes of the conflict.
Their conclusion was that "The meaning of peacebuilding is therefore to create
"structures" that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to war" (Preti, 2002,
pp.104). This is where it is important also to make a distinction between historical and
empirical reference. The Guatemalan conflict started as a traditional ideological conflict
between a left oriented guerrilla force (the URNG) and the counterinsurgency strategy
from the army to defend a highly unequal socioeconomic status quo. The conflict was
characterized by massive forced displacements, extreme violence against civilian
populations, and use of paramilitary structures. The relationship between the actors and
the structures of violence during the war is one of oppression and inequality.
We can explain the functionality of the conflict from a political economy
approach. "The continuation of war can be a consequence of the existence of vested
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interests, both political and economic, often shared by parties so that the objective is not
always to win the war but to increase the benefits of the belligerents: This situation of
shared aims leads sometimes to forms of cooperation between enemies defines as
'cooperative conflict"' (Preti, 2002, pp. l 02)
Preti argues that "40,000 Guatemalan soldiers, plus around 500,000 members of
army-backed civil patrols failed to bring under control the 2,000-strong URNG rebel
group, despite the fact that it had not posed a major threat to the government since
mid-1980s."(Preti, 2002, pp.106). These data suggests that belligerent actors may have
not shared economic benefits, but they shared political aims towards achieving different
economic benefits. There was an intentionality in prolonging the conflict.
Another important aspect of the conflict of interests between actors was the fact
that the population found the involvement in the armed conflict more beneficial than their
subsistence activities. The incentive for people to join the guerrillas was more economic
than it was political. Therefore General Rios Montt designed the National Plan for
Security

and

development

counterinsurgency

as

an

essential

element

for

the

government's

campaign. Under this analysis, Rios Montt understood the

functionality of war as an income generating enterprise and intended to replace it with a
new institution. However, the war also served political functions. Such intentionality can
be seen through the amount of attacks against the civilian population. More than
suppressing guerrillas, it serve to suppress political and cultural opposition.
While analyzing post-civil war Guatemala, it is also important to recognize that
after the accords Guatemala was categorized by the World Bank as one of the most
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violent countries in Central America. Direct violence prevailed even after conflict was
over, "The situation in Guatemala remained characterised by poverty and inequality.
Ranking 120 in the 2000 HDI. 54 percent of the Guatemalan population live below the
UN-defined line of poverty and 23 percent of the Guatemalan population live in the
extreme line of poverty."(Preti, 2002, pp. I I 0). This leaves Guatemala with a "fragile
democracy" in the aftermath of the conflict: "The democracy currently existing in
Guatemala is actually a new form of violence, resulting from the military and political
project started by the coup in 1981. The peace accords represent for the army the final
institutionalisation of their strange strategic project to win the war militarily and
politically by neutralizing and reinserting guerrilla in the political life"(Preti, 2002,
pp.111 ). The military had changes in reduction of personnel, but kept its wartime budget
and doctrine. Not to mention that this process did not account for the lack of peasant and
indigenous participation while debating the terms of agreement (in a country where over
half of the population are indigenous people who have been historically marginalized).
We also see a trend from the international financial institutions to incorporate civil
society into their portfolio in the 1990s. However, the nature of these economic and
cultural ideals that were coming from above ended up marginalizing less powerful actors
trying to materialize their claims from below. "The country's ethnic diversity is still not
recognized and valued as one of its sources of wealth and indigenous people continue to
be subject to strong racial, ethnic and cultural discrimination, which undermines hwnan
rights" (Preti, 2002, pp.1 1 2 ).
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In tenns of addressing the structural roots of the Guatemalan conflict, we see a
change in the relationship between belligerent parties, who agreed to peacefully coexist
in the aftennath of the conflict. This did not address the direct type of violence towards
the Guatemalan population. Even though there was a big involvement of international
financial institutions and the United Nations towards trying to achieve a long lasting
peace, the relevant decisions and direction towards which the Guatemalan post-conflict
society was heading were up to the discretion of the domestic actors sitting on the
negotiation tables. We see how the international financial organizations attempting to
liberalize the economy had a heavier influence over powerful actors than the UN
peacebuilding approach to restructure the society to provide alternatives to the function of
war and to address structural violence. An important lesson from this case is that one
cannot effectively address a conflict by imposing solutions that are not tied to its
functionality and structural causes. "Solutions cannot be imported and peace has to be
built by the people themselves: the role of civil society in defining the priorities in the
peace process is crucial." (Preti, 2002, pp.116).

Establishment ofa Transitional Society with the Aid ofInternational Actors.

When it comes to institutional refonn as a long tenn influential measure to
address politico-economic inequalities of the conflict, it is important to recognize the
importance of the short tenn goals in order to guarantee the stability of these new
institutions and their capability of functioning efficiently, with binding authority and
accountability. There are few possibilities of success when institutions are built in a
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context where the society and the political climate that constitute them are still unstable
and polarized, or still engaged in the same structures that gave birth to conflict and
prolonged its duration. It is important that in the process of establishing a democracy by
rebuilding a society's trust in institutions, there is also trust among the actors that were
part of the historical violent structures. However, states attempting to put an end of an
armed conflict often struggle to settle the conflict due to a lack of trust among belligerent
domestic parties. This is the reason why strategies like peacekeeping are relevant to this
discussion, so this section is going to focus on the role of international actors in settling
disputes where domestic actors lack capacity.
Child argues that strategies that involve third party credible neutral verifiers and
guarantors of peace agreement can be an effective approach towards the resolution of the
conflict. The contribution of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN to
the Central American peace has been relevant because "Instead of the previous simple
and easily definable categories of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building,
theoreticians and practitioners of conflict resolution now speak of "multifaceted" or
"multi disciplinary" approaches. This explains the disparity between the success of the
"Esquipulas" peace processes in Central America in the late 1980s aided by the UN and
the OAS, in contrast of the Contadora peace processes (promoted by Mexico, Colombia,
Venezuela, Panama) which were not perceived as being effective or credible. The UN
interventions began with the UN observer group in Central America (ONUCA), which
later contributed to the creation of United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.
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In the 1980s, Latin America started to receive conflict resolution aid from the
OAS, the UN and other countries such as Canada and Spain. These actors operated in
different areas of the conflict according to their capabilities. Their roles in the Central
American processes (Contadora/Esquipulas) were focused on peace making, in other
words, resolving conflict through negotiation, mediation and arbitration or conciliation.
However once peace was established in the form of a bilateral ceasefire, organizations
like the ONUCA had to take a different approach such as peacebuilding and
peacekeeping.
We see this type of intervention for the first time in the Nicaraguan case. The shift
of strategies according to the context of the conflict was evident in this case, when the
ONUCA was intended to function as an observation and verification organization.
However, the unarmed UN observers did not have an impact in de-mobilizing troops.
Therefore the UN Security Council had to expand ONUCA's mandate by giving it
combat power. We see the implementation of strategies of peace-enforcement and
peacekeeping by ONUCA when it sent a Venezuelan battalion to convince the
Nicaraguan contras to demobilize, and was placed afterwards among the contras and the
Sandinista Army to prevent armed altercations. At the same time, the OAS created the
CIAV-OAS which was responsible for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
of every contra and contra family member who crossed the border back into Nicaragua
from their camps in Honduras and Costa Rica. Later in the 1990s the UN designated a
different commission to monitor the elections, another task that the post-conflict
Nicaraguan state wasn't able to carry out on its own yet. What is interesting about the
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international participation of different NGOs is that the Sandinistas trusted more the role
of the participation of ONUVEN, UNDP and UNICEF than the regional OAS-CIAV. This
is partially explained by the recognition of an implicit interest from the United States to
protect the

contras

behind the involvement of the OAS, which had been historically

dominated by the U.S.
The apparent bias from the OAS-CIAV was based on the fact that "If they did
their job poorly, and did not support well the contras they would be criticised by their
OAS superiors in Washington and by the US government, which was financing the whole
Contra support operation. On the other hand, if they did their job well and effectively
helped Contras, they would be criticised by the Sandinistas for going too far in keeping
the Contras together, and possibly for even stimulating them to take up arms again."
(Child, 1999, pp.21). This is a clear example that the performance of a NGO is biased in
the sense that its bound to serve the interest of whoever is funding it. This bias has in this
case is based on the OAS' history of being a political instrument of the U.S.
We see a deep contrast with the peacebuilding and peacemaking strategies that
took place in El Salvador. The ONUSAL was the first mission to be sent before a
ceasefire was concluded, where human right verifications were seen as part of the
process, and the first time a UN mission was so involved in the resolution of an internal
conflict from start to finish. This process worked because the government of El Salvador
and the Farabundo Marti Front of National Liberation (FMLN) were both willing to end
the conflict (and neither side was clearly prevailing militarily after 12 years of hostilities).
The success of the OAS and UN effort in Nicaragua was a big contributor to these results.
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The initial role of the ONUSAL was to supervise the accords signed between the FMLN
and the Salvadoran government. However, the immediate task that the ONUSAL was
designated for was the protection of human rights, given the fact that there hadn't been a
ceasefire established at the time it was deployed. The consequent task that the ONUSAL
faced was building trust among the belligerent actors. This is an important consideration
regarding the role of international organizations, because it doesn't matter how effective
an organization is in overseeing the disarmament operations, if the guerrilla members are
not committed to the process as much as the peacekeeping actor is, the role of the latter
may tum out to be irrelevant. For example, the fear that the FMLN was turning in their
obsolete weapons and keeping their better ones for future use was later confirmed by the
the discovery of an arms cache in Nicaragua. Despite ONUSAL's efforts, this threatened
the process, since the opposition parties had reasons to believe that the FMLN was not to
be trusted, and gave an excuse to the government to not give up on police and
intelligence functions.
Overall, ONUSAL helped significantly to establish trust and maintain a neutral
position on the conflict. The ONUSAL took over some of the tasks that the Salvadoran
state wasn't ready to perform while it was transitioning to democracy. A clear example of
this was when the ONUSAL also took over the role of running the 1994 post-conflict
elections, when the Supreme Electoral Tribunal threatened to cause a collapse of the
voter registration process and ruin the elections. The input of ONUSAL in the Salvadoran
peace process was of great relevance, in fact former FMLN commander Joaquin
Villalobos argues that "without the UN there would have not been no peace process, and
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perhaps not even any negotiations" (Child, 1999, pp.23). In this sense, ONUSAL fulfilled
the functional duty of a third party neutral actor described by Lake in the previous
chapter, in which a more reliable institution is set in place until the Salvadoran state
regained its legitimacy. This response was appropriate, however it does not account for
the challenges presented post-conflict after the immediate elections that the ONUSAL
supported. The achievement of political "stability" and conflict resolution in the short
term does not mean the same structures are going to be in place in the long term, since
the post-conflict political and social climate in El Salvador does not respond to the
commitments established by ONUSAL during the peace agreements.
On the other hand, the peace process in Guatemala was more challenging in terms
of achieving consensus among main actors of the conflict, as a result of differences
regarding the functionality of the conflict as well as the nature of the pre-conflict political
and social structures. In 1994, " representatives of the Guatemalan government and
URNG met in Mexico and signed the 'Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the
Negotiating Process' where the negotiators requested the presence of the UN as a
guarantor while refused to call for the OAS. This agreement led to the creation of the
United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) which was formalized as an
institution in 1994. The nature of the consensus building in this particular conflict was
hard to navigate due to the fact that "the military generals believed they had the upper
hand regarding the URNG due to their counter insurgency capabilities, even though it
was at the expense of indigenous populations" (Child, 1999, pp.28). This is why
MINUGUA fell short in terms of resources to handle the conflict, so it had to collaborate
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with other UN agencies. It also saw several limitations of cooperation from the
Guatemalan government over issues such as unresolved human rights cases, the
disappearance of key guerrilla leaders, the slow pace of police reform and problems with
the land reform program. This helps to account for the increase in crime rates and
violence that Guatemala saw in the aftermath of the conflict. Public order was established
by extra judicial mechanisms, since civilians were taking justice into their own hands. In
the countryside, landowners began to establish their own private armies. The MINUGUA
and UNDP rehabilitation programs seemed to have little impact on the reintegration of
the ex-combatants. This also reflects the poor performance of the Guatemalan army in
establishing a legitimate use of their coercive force to protect the Guatemalan people,
resulting in the establishment of a culture of fear, prolonging the cycles of violence based
on the lack of institutionalized security.
The point of analyzing this conflict is to emphasize the role of building stable
institutions in the aftermath of the conflict. It is hard to build peace and heal a society
affected by historical violence, where the transition has been from a violent context of
inequalities to a silent context of structural inequalities constituting a negative peace. In
other words, where the institutional post-conflict context does not allow for a
transformative justice approach. The Guatemalan institutions did not engage m
significant reforms, while MINUGUA and other international actors took care of
stabilizing the society and assisted in the conflict resolution process.
This is why the role of external peacekeepers becomes even more challenging. In
the Guatemalan case, MINUGUA had to fight the post-conflict violence while the
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structural causes of violence were still triggering indirect and direct violence in the
population. A similar example of this in El Salvador is when ONUSAL was charged with
ferreting out and publicizing human rights violations which were frequently committed
by officials of the Salvadoran government, while on the other hand building the human
rights institutions of the very government it was criticizing.

Post-Conflict Context: Neoliberalism vs. Community Empowerment
It is easy to assume a direct relationship between the way a conflict ended and the
type of society that precedes it. One would think that the conflict resolution and
effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations would lay the groundwork for a long lasting
peace and a change in the political structures towards guaranteeing a stable democracy
automatically. The variable that is not often factored into the analysis is the elites, civil
society and international actor's capability to comply with the terms of the peace accords
once the external accountability mechanisms are removed. The cases of post-conflict
Guatemala and El Salvador prove that the way a peace process ends, even when
democratic elections are achieved, doesn't guarantee a positive peace (i.e.• with the social
justice component that is essential for peace to be sustainable) within that society. The
post-transitional society and government are the main drivers of the course of the
socio-political realities, regarding of the terms of the accords. Peace processes should not
be treated as identical everywhere when it comes to analyzing their effectiveness. Each
peace process has different stages from ceasefire, to disarmament, to trust building and
reparations, to negotiation of the tenns of the intended post-conflict society, to the actual

35

construction of the latter. The effectiveness of a peace process must be understood as the
individual effectiveness of each one of its stages, as well as the actor's compliance with
the final outcome. In both comparative cases, El Salvador and Guatemala, we see
struggling post-transitional societies because of the lack of commitment to fulfill the
terms of the peace accords from the political elites. In other words, the socioeconomic
structure of extreme elite domination is the underlying obstacle to lasting peacebuilding.
Looking at the Salvadoran peace process, Wade argues that the main
achievements of the peace process were "the cessation of armed conflict, the
restructuring of military and police forces, the demobilization and integration of the
FMLN as a political party and basic guarantees for human rights" (Wade, 2008, pp.1 5) In
other words, the extent of the peace process was mainly deterring the direct violence
imposed upon society. It is important to recognize that socio-economic reforms were not
mentioned among the results of the peace process. This is a key point, since the economic
inequality was one of the underlying causes of the Salvadoran conflict. "The structural
roots of the Salvadoran process were socio-economic inequalities maintained by
systematic repression from the government" (Wade, 2008, pp. 1 7). These much-needed
economic reforms were left out of the peace agreements and assumed to be taken care of
by the post-transition democratic society. "Although the FMLN has based its armed
struggle on battling socio-economic injustices, the social and economic aspects of the
peace accords were left until the end of the negotiations and were very limited in
scope"(Wade, 2008, pp.22). The type of economic policy that came along with the
establishment of a democracy was the driving factor in reproducing the same economic
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inequalities by different international actors. Wade explains that "the application of
liberal internationalism (through political and economic liberalization) threatens
long-term prospects for peace" (Wade, 2008, pp.18), because of the structural violence
that it reproduces.
According to Boyce, the type of reform that was needed to address structural
socio-economic violence should have been in the form of an "alternative socio economic
model designed to alleviate inequality and support the peace process to agrarian reform,
reduction of military expenses, progressive tax policy, support for non-traditional exports
and creation of financial institutions to provide local credit" (Wade, 2008, pp. 18). These
type of reforms, however, are incompatible with the principles of a neoliberal ("free
market") ideology and economic model.
The 1992 peace accords designated the Forum for Economic and Social
Conciliation (FORO) to address socio-economic issues left out of the accords, and to
guarantee former guerrilla members could achieve the socio-economic items left out of
the peace accords agenda. The lack of fulfilment of these items was in part due to the
unwillingness of "the Cristiani government to allow open discussion of its economic
policies, a position that was supported by the United States and international financial
institutions" (Wade, 2008, pp.23).
If one looks at the post-transition economy of El Salvador, "The decline in
poverty and inequality in 200-2004 is impressive...The Salvadoran government has
touted these improvements as the results of various anti-poverty measures implemented
by various administrations. However the truth behind this trend reveals the poverty of the
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neoliberal model" (Wade, 2008, pp.24). The amount of socio-economic reforms passed
by the Salvadoran government does not contribute to this growth as much as the amount
of remittances sent by family members working abroad, mainly in the United States.
"The failure of the neoliberal model to develop a productive, self-sufficient economy is
creating forced migration in numbers greater than during the war'' (Wade, 2008, pp. 24).
This type of "economic independence" from the transitional society on the government similar to the "rentier state" phenomenon in some oil-rich states - has also given the
government more freedom, since the responsibility of providing economic opportunities
and rights was dissociated by the role of remittances. This explains the "Large presence
of remittances has allowed the government to pursue policies that would have otherwise
been met with widespread resistance" (Wade, 2008, pp.25) However this economy
dependent on remittances won't be as stable, since this also means that remittances will
only endure as long as the U.S. economy is strong and U.S. immigration policy is stable
(particularly the Temporary Protected Status, or TPS, granted to Salvadorans since the
1980s).
The lack of a strong government responding to people's needs has also caused an
increase in crime. The "Government responses to the crime wave have been constrained
by the neoliberal model. Unable to address the problem through preventive and
redistributive programs, the Salvadoran government has utilized authoritarian measures
to fight crime." (Wade, 2008, pp.27). Given the increase in crime, the association of the
country's elites under the umbrella organization of the far-right political party ARENA
took advantage of the public safety crisis to discredit the FMLN during the 2004
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elections. The image of the FMLN linked with international terrorism became
widespread, linking images ofFMLN candidate Shafik Handal next to Osama Bin Laden.
These elections had a serious impact on the Salvadoran political system. Later on, the
"Salvadoran government also approved the Special Anti-Terrorism Law, which
criminalized common means of protests, such as demonstrations, marches, occupying
buildings and street blockades as acts of terrorism" (Wade, 2008, pp.28). This meant that
despite the socio-economic inequalities, a lack of political representation and the increase
in state repression, now the Salvadoran people were also legally prevented from acting as
a civil society due to fear. The institutionalized fear prevents a civilian-led reconstruction
of the post-conflict context. Crime has increased political polarization as well as the
Salvadoran state's legitimation of authoritarian repressive actions.
The new political context shows the unwillingness of ARENA to subordinate its
own interests to the common good of a sustainable peace, so instead they are playing a
"spoiler" role. In terms of economic progress, the fact that Salvadorans are leaving the
country to find better economic opportunities is "symptomatic of a country in crisis, not
enjoying the fruits of a hard-won peace" (Wade, 2008, pp.29). In conclusion, in the
post-transition society, that initial climate of tolerance resulting from successful peace
accords in El Salvador was disturbed and remains undermined by socio-economic
inequalities, political polarization and violent crime due to the government's lack of
commitment to comply with the process. This implies that the much-needed institutional
reform did not happen, therefore the fulfilment of immediate needs attached to even the
limited transitional justice approach cannot be pursued by the government. On the other
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hand, the institutionalized fear together with the lack of local means of sustenance
prevents the civil population from engaging in a broader transformative justice approach
where the post-conflict change would come from below.

The Guatemalan Response to Neoliberalism

Just like in El Salvador, neoliberalism has also been a predominant topic of the
post-transition government following the peace processes and the 1996 peace accord.
This context has facilitated the consolidation of an alliance between elites, military elites
and transnational capital. (Granovski-Larsen, 2017, pp. 54). The post conflict state of
Guatemala consists of the continuity of wartime, power and violence, alongside
neoliberal economic reform favoring transnational investment and capital accumulation.
The civil society has found itself in a situation where the economic system offers benefits
that limit the achievement of their long term goals. "Black land-rights movements in
Central America must choose between neoliberal land concessions and continued
adherence to transformative goals." (Granovski-Larsen, 2017, pp. 54). What is really
interesting about the Guatemalan civil society as opposed to the Salvadoran civil society,
is their approach to neoliberalism threatening their interests. Many Salvadorans,
unwilling to mobilize against the state due to fear, decide to move abroad to sustain their
livelihood. On the other hand, in Guatemala, "social movement actors have engaged
strategically with neoliberal resources-in this case, funding for "market-led agrarian
reform" promoted by the World Bank-to construct counter hegemonic forms of
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repression."(Granovsky-Larsen, pp.54)
The political reality of Guatemalan society was still very restrictive of their
fundamental rights, due to the combination of neoliberalism and its economic context that
favored the Guatemalan armed forces as a rising branch of the economic elite. "The
Guatemalan armed forces had exerted their independence from the traditional oligarchy
and had emerged as a significant economic, and not only political, power with control
over vast areas of land (much of it stolen during the war), investment in banking and
other sectors, and various areas of organized crime including the drug trade"
(Granovsky-Larsen, 2017, pp.57). This also fostered a guiding principle of national
reform based on neoliberalism, which set the country's elite to dominate the post conflict
period by refraining from social welfare, at the same time that the economy was open to
the global markets and transnational extractive projects (such as mining and electricity
generation).
However the response from the campesino (peasant) communities differed from
the Salvadoran people. Given the lack of effective government structures and no defined
guarantees after the peace accords were signed, the Guatemalan rural society took a
different initiative towards getting their needs fulfilled. "The emergence of the campesino
social movement in Guatemala began with the formation in 1978 of the Comite de
Unidad Campesina (Committee for Campesino Unity-CUC). The CUC represented the
first social movement organization focused on campesino demands to be founded by
campesinos themselves . . . . 992 a number of large carnpesino organizations including the
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CUC and the CCDA created the first national campesino umbrella group: the
Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas"(Granovski-Larsen, 201 7, pp.58)
After the accords were signed, the challenges of administering the neoliberal resources
and settling the tenns for an agrarian reform, encouraged the creation of the Platafonna
Agraria, a group of campesino and non-campesino movements which refused to
participate in the state's institution in charge of administering land (FRONTIERRAS).
The campesino movements were facing a transition to a resource extraction
economy that was also focusing on the incorporation of agrofuel production. The use and
distribution of land for a new rural economy and the intersection between private and
campesino movements implied a demand for more involvement from the state
institutions. However, the state presence remained weak in mediating and regulating
extractive policies. The participation of the campesino movements in the new rural
economic system protected peasants from repression and guaranteed them access to land
to some extent. In terms of the conditions for indigenous populations in this new system,
these were guaranteed by the Guatemalan state's application of a "neoliberal
multiculturalism" type of policy, which granted indigenous rights conditionally under this
economic order. According to Granovski-Larsen, the state "actively re-constitutes them in
its own image, shearing them of radical excesses, inciting them to do the work of
subject-formation that otherwise would fall to the state itself." (Granovsky-Larsen, 2017,
pp.60). The issue with this type of cooptation attempt arises in terms of the fulfilment of
the right of land, security and other basic needs that the state should be guaranteeing from
the government to the people. Campesino and indigenous movements had to choose
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between

accepting the benefits offered by neoliberalism to satisfy their immediate

economic and land-related needs, or ignore the system and fight for a deeper structural
reform by rejecting this type of agreement. This is when anti-neoliberal forms of
organization start to become a new alternative used by grassroots actors to harness the
neoliberal resources in a beneficial way.
An example of this is the CCDA, which embraced FRONTIERRAS and other
economic guarantees produced by the peace accords to organize a new scheme of
production in the rural communities, and to push for political participation at a national
level. One of the main successes of CCDA is the outreach it has had in assisting
communities to gain access to lands for coffee production, to facilitate the financing of its
three strategic objects: recovery and defense of land and territory, production and
self-sufficiency, and political activism aimed at achieving state power. The
accomplishments of these goals were also attached to the CCDA through networking
with other local programs such as Cafe Justicia. The CCDA's goal is to make sure that
once campesinos are given their lands, they are well prepared to contribute to the
community's growth by adopting organic production of coffee as well as self-sufficiency
techniques to avoid reliance on the state. Sustainability is not only encouraged in coffee
production, it is also encouraged in macadamia nuts processing, honey production and
structuring campesino local markets. We see this type of dynamis playing out in the
community of Don Pancho where "each family received seven pieces of land across the
farm's many areas {including coffee plantations, pasture, and vegetable plots) and the
farm is managed by an elected community council and maintained by mandatory work on
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community infrastructure" (Granovsky-Larsen. 2017, pp.63).The example of the
community Don Pancho illustrates the effective role of the CCDA as a community
organizer. The community used the land facilitated to them through FRONTIERRAS to
work on a community basis, to achieve collective goals such as gathering the payments
for the acquired land or achieving sustainability and economic dependency from state's
neoliberal policies. We also see that the organic local coffee market still has to operate
within the global market, however the grassroots organizations have not compromised
their political agenda in the process of participating in the neoliberal markets.
Rural communities have shown a spirit of resistance, preventing resource
extraction through blockades and the use of community plebiscites the as a tool of
political participation against large-scale economic projects. One of the mechanisms by
which these populations seeked for help was the international law. mainly the Convention
169 of the International Labor Organization, which says that no "development" projects
can take place in ancestral indigenous territories without "free, prior, and informed
consultation" (FPIC) of the communities. These plebiscites were ignored by the
government in 2012, causing the local communities to engage in a blockade of the mine
El Tambor, to which the government responded with the use of armed force against the
community. Due to weak state presence in terms of protecting campesino and indigenous
rights and the strong state presence in terms of using the military to repress legitimate
claims regarding the fulfilment of these rights, communities decided to find alternative
approaches to fight institutionalized structural and direct violence.
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Another example of this is found in collective organizations like the National
Indigenous and Peasant Coordinator (CONIC), whose representatives "come from
communities that have engaged in land struggles in the same areas covered by their
collectives, giving them the benefit of understanding the cultural, linguistic, political, and
economic dynamics of the region as well as a variety of direct-action tactics for land
access...as of 2014, the group had seen 144 communities through to formal land
ownership." (Granovski-Larsen, 2017, pp.67) We see a period of local rural engagement
in the form of collective boards known as "micro-regional councils." The communities of
Champerico and Retalhuleu have developed organizational priorities in areas such as the
distribution of funding, and have planned and established systems of security (radio
communication across the communities and holding cells for troublemakers) and health
(health posts, herbal gardens, and training in traditional indigenous methods of
treatment). These communities begun to rebuild their own local institutions as a lack of
responsiveness to the post-conflict governmental institutions. In other words, they
assumed the responsibilities that the Guatemalan state had neglected even prior to the
start of the armed conflict. However, they still respond to state's neglect to their claims
with marches, roadblocks, land occupations and protests, especially during the Perez
Molina administration. They are still advocating for their recognition from the
government as part of civil society.
From this we can conclude that the post-conflict period was characterized by
aspirations to peace and structural transformation, competing with the transition to
neoliberalism and the consolidation of power among economic and military elites within
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a transnational economy. Now, the communities are seeking ways to respond to the
neoliberal economy and the challenges that come along with the decisions made by
powerful elites protecting their status quo. Social movements and collective participation
in sustainable development strategies are now the social and economic strategy used by
grassroots movements to fulfill their needs while avoiding state repression.
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Chapter III: Historical Background and Complexities of the Colombian
Peace Process
Previous Latin American peace processes may be helpful to identify what
strategies have been used under which contexts. They also allow policy makers and
drafting actors of peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies to identify what mistakes
were previously made by other governments so that they are not repeated in the case of
Colombia. However, it is relevant to this discussion to recognize that the Colombian
peace process is distinct from those of Guatemala, Nicaragua or El Salvador. The
Colombian conflict involved several variables combined with the involvement of illicit
drugs fuelling the conflict, together with inadequate state responses that added a high
degree of complexity to addressing a long-lasting, or effective at the very least, solution.
The issues that negotiating actors and the Colombian government face are deeply rooted
in social, political and economic cycles of structural violence that can be traced back to
the period of "La Violencia" in 1948. This period of time was characterized by a violent
struggle among the Conservative and Liberal parties to remain in power, under a system
of limited political competition. "Colombia never overcame the nineteenth century
political divisions between liberal and conservative: never resolved nineteenth-century
issues of centralism versus federalism; never established a national government that truly
forged and administered the nation; never replaced personalism, factionalism, and quest
for partisan hegemony with a modem political agenda." (Holmes, 2010, pp.21)
Even after the agreement establishing the National Front or "Frente Nacional''
that put an end to "La Violencia," the political and social change that was needed was not
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directed to the areas in need. The Colombian governmental structures adopted a new
political order by which the Liberal and Conservative parties would take turns in office as
a solution to the previous violent period. However, several academics like Marco
Palacios would argue that the bi-partisan struggle was not a fight between the Liberals
and the Conservatives themselves, it was a struggle within a polarized society who
identified with the ideals of different parties led by the party leaders. The ideological
component was more a trigger for violence, given the underlying equalities among
different parts of the Colombian society such as the urban working class and the rural
peasant class. William Ospina argues that the violence was a war between peasants and
citizens from one party against peasants and citizens from another party. Jorge Eliecer
Gaitan helped to promote a whole new way of seeing the political reality. Similar to other
Central American dynamics in the 1930s, there was a class struggle between an agrarian
oligarchy and the poor peasants. In this sense, the fight was not between two parties but
between the agrarian oligarchy and the people. The fact of the matter is that the issues
that gave birth to "La Violencia," high levels of inequality in the agrarian and urban
spheres together with dissatisfaction with the political order, were not addressed by a
bipartisan agreement, since it focused on the political sphere only by sponsoring an
"oligarchic democracy." After the settlement of the National Front, the rural areas as well
as the poor urban areas started to advocate for agency towards solving these underlying
issues that the Colombian state has neglected to address. For the purpose of this research,
the focus of this discussion is going to be narrowed to the rural areas since that is where
the armed conflict first arose.
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The Andes mountain range set the rural areas in a position of disadvantage due to
the disconnect from the rest of the country that this geographical isolation represents.
There is a deep gap between the rural areas where political decisions are made and the
rural areas, extractive havens that support the economy of the country. This disconnect
has made the issues in the rural areas less visible to the Colombian government as well as
to the rest of the Colombian public opinion until now. Holmes argues that "geographic
separation thus came to reinforce all the basic socioeconomic and cultural differences
among major regions, and the result was an intense sectionalism that vastly complicated
the first efforts at political organization" (Holmes, 2010, pp. 20) which ended up
reinforcing a state of "permanent and endemic warfare."
The first variable that favored the conditions for the armed conflict to begin was
the state's neglect of rural areas. The terms under which the state was involved in rural
areas were conditioned on two main factors, the convenience of the landowners and the
application of policies favoring export crops for the most part. "Throughout the l 960s,
USAID, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank all provided
development assistance to Colombia with the explicit priority of supporting the
development of commercial export crop" (Thomson, 2011, pp.337). This left small
landholders in a powerless situation where all the state's efforts to support the rural areas
were specifically tailored to cash crops rather than public investment and rural
development. Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador experienced a similar rural dynamic
related to the national economy's "agroexport dependency." Wealth was generated from
export profits rather than a successful domestic economic growth based on the wealth of
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their own people. In fact, profits for the agroexport elites depended on the continued
poverty and limited land access of the peasantry, which guaranteed their availability for
low-wage seasonal labor for harvesting export crops. It became hard for peasants to
endure the harsh labor conditions and constant unaddressed violence from landowners
product of the societal structures shaped by " La Violencia." Peasant communities had to
sustain themselves and claim their autonomy from landowners while trying to compete
for the domestic market with foreign industrial agriculture enterprises. "The expansion of
agricultural exports, which grew by an average of 8.7 per cent a year throughout the
1960s, had problematic corollaries in domestic food production." ( Thomson, 2011,
pp.337). Food security, public security as well as economic sustenance became main
unaddressed issues for the peasants.
This is when we start to see the close relationship between economic inequalities
and conflict. In the case of Colombia, the attempt to address these inequalities by the
peasants led to the beginning of a new cycle of armed violence, triggered by the same
constant variables that triggered the previous one. The same unequal structures present
during "La Violencia" were still in place under the new political regime, which means
that the same struggles that the liberal-guerrillas were fighting for were transferred to a
new social sphere. On the other hand, the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), which
was also left out of the National Front, took an important role in organizing the rural
areas in order for them to "take justice on their own hands" given the government's
neglect to do so. Eventually, rural self-defense groups arose as a consequence of the
combination of the discontent of peasants with the constant threat of violence from
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landowners, together with the ideological and political fundamentals set down by the
PCC after several failed attempts to get the peasants' interests represented in the
government's agenda through political participation. And so, "The great social inequality
and instability gives rise to a dynamic that confers legitimacy on revolutionary projects
and violent alternatives" (Holmes, 2010, pp.8 1 ). The campesino self-defense groups were
providing for the community's security needs as well as advocating for a self-sustainable
communal system where they would organize independently in order to avoid going
through the state to fulfill their needs.
At that point it was clear that the claims voiced by the PCC and the campesinos
were only achievable through agrarian reform, which directly targeted the areas of
economic interests of the United States in Colombia, since the peasant economic
autonomy initiative challenged the export-based control of natural resources in the rural
areas. Conflicts also emerged as poor peasants refused to be bound by unfair labor
arrangements of big corporations, in the presence of a new local economic alternative.
The government responded to this threat of a new political and social movement by
repressing it. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla banned the PCC and attacked its armed enclaves.
Forced displacements into Tolima, Meta and Caqueta led to settlement of communities
that would later organize into the FARC government. This is because "The country's
long history of government repression is closely tied to the influence of US
counterinsurgency policy, which has sought to insulate the Colombian state from popular
pressures for reform" (Thomson, 2010, pp. 338) In fact,it could be argued that the
formalization of the FARC as an armed group was in response to the Marquetalia
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Operation, a US sponsored military attack, part of a larger project called the Plan LASO
(Latin American Security Operation). The US provided a bomber to attack the enclave as
well as the training and armaments to do so. Most importantly, the United States
intervention in Colombia was particularly successful in implementing its anti-communist
agenda in Colombian politics as well as in society. Due to the Cold War context and the
success of the Cuban Revolution, the United States foreign policy strongly focused on
communism contention plans in Colombia to avoid the left talcing power.

The

culmination of political exclusion together with increasing violence and lack of economic
opportunities prove that the FARC's origin did not take place in a vacuum. However, its
lack of mass support can be explained by the derogatory language used by the political
elite-owned media, including TV channels and the main national newspaper, to refer to
this group. The public media gave a clear impression to shape public opinion of the
FARC: They were criminals.
From a structural violence approach, the origin of the FARC becomes a starting
point towards the discussion of the issues that were carried all along the way until the
present, while new factors of complexity were added to the Colombian conflict. The
ideological antagonism between leftist armed rebels and a right-wing US-influenced
government, also "gave birth the establishment of a rural subculture, a peasant social
class and a revolutionary peasant group constituted by this same social class."(Thomson,
2011, pp.15). As a consequence we see new groups like the ELN and EPL built on
similar two types of exclusion: social exclusion of the rural poor and political exclusion
of the National Front. Despite the repeated attempts of these originally self-defense
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groups to voice their need for government participation and political agency, the
government took minimal action toward addressing the issues related to land distribution
and rural areas improvement. An example of this is the Agrarian Social Reform Law in
1958; Thomson argues that even ten years after it was implemented, only 1 percent of the
land qualified for redistribution was distributed(Thomson, 2011) It is also important to
recall that most of this land was also state owned. The lack of the government's will to
address the issues that the FARC, ELN, EPL were advocating for in their early stages
would have costly consequences. The Colombian government's reaction to demands for
reform has historically been characterized by repressive measures that are effective only
in prolonging the effects of injustice rather than attacking the causes of it.
In fact, the poor conditions of the rural economy escalated to the point where the
peasants were incapable of producing in large scale, or of generating goods with prices
that could compete in the newly forming neoliberal market. This created the conditions
for the growth of illicit drug cultivation in Colombia. The proliferation of illicit crops in
Colombia implied the involvement of yet another relevant actor to the armed conflict (the
drug cartels), as well as a change in the behavior of the Colombian legal institutions.
Starting in the 1970s, the "narcobourgeoisie" generated a whole new wave of problems.
In the first place, they were a source of financing for the guerrilla groups, who started to
gain profits from taxing the amount of cocaine transporting or taxing peasants for the
amount of cocaine produced, initially, so that armed groups like FARC became regulators
and guardians of the illicit crops. However, It was not until 2002 after President Alvaro
Uribe was elected that the FARC began to be involved in production and transportation of
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illicit crops with the help of the AUC (United Self-defense Forces of Colombia, i.e. the
right-wing paramilitaries). In the second place, given their economic affluence, their
agenda was filtered through the Colombian legal system through a system of financial
transactions to senators and congressmen or sponsoring political campaigns. A clear
example of this was the election of drug cartel leader Pablo Escobar as representative to
the House of Representatives in the 1980s, as well as the well known 800 Process, which
sought to investigate the sponsoring of the Cali drug cartel to the presidential campaign
of President Ernesto Samper as well as other congressmen. This new addition to the legal
system implied a shift in priorities of the government towards an agenda that was
beneficial to the powerful actors now including drug dealers, instead of addressing the
strengthening of the rural economies or political participation of those with the
willingness to advocate for that kind of policy.
Given the threat that conflict presented to foreign investment and economic
stability, President Belisario Betancur started the first peace process in 1982 as the
transition to illicit crops was happening in the middle of the armed conflict. This peace
treaty included amnesty to guerrilla members, as well as the consensus to finally allow
the FARCs political representation by the signing of the Uribe Accords which created the
Patriotic Union (UP) as a political party for leftist rebels who lay down arms. The UP
was also growing politically. In the 1986 elections the UP candidate Jaime Pardo Leal
gained 328,752 votes, the biggest amount of votes that a leftist candidate had ever had.
For the first time in Colombia's history, a leftist party had established a notable presence
on the country's political scene. As a response to the threat of the rise of the left in
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Colombia, the government reacted by implementing Law 48. This law allowed the
military forces to organize and arm civilian units to fight the growth of the UP and the
PARC. In fact, "In 1988 when the party's candidates proved victorious in sixteen mayoral
elections, three of them were immediately assassinated." (Thomson, 2011, pp.30). It
became a "political genocide": more than two thousand members of the UP were
assassinated during five-year period.
,,
An important enabler group of this "political witch-hunt were the right-wing
paramilitaries, who started as private armies hired by landowners, drug traffickers and the
business sector to protect their interests from the PARC and other leftist guerrilla groups:
The paramilitaries. The paramilitary groups started as local self-defense groups to oppose
the FARC's growth in landowner areas. This was because the principle of self-defense
became very important to maintain a sense of order in the rural areas from different
groups, the peasants and the land owners. That is, because the Colombian government did
not take legitimate use of their coercive power to attack the leftist peasants,
"Paramilitarism served a strategic goal in combating a strengthening armed insurgency...
Civilian authorities weakened the institutional role of the armed forces in part in order to
become more integrated in a neoliberal economic order, while tolerating or facilitating
paramilitary repression of political and military opposition to this integration." (Aviles,
2006, pp.285). This group of people that were now legitimized by Law 48 operated
legally in the name of democracy, although they "are responsible for a large part of the
violence and human rights of the country. In 1989 they killed 11 members of judicial
institutions" (Bibes, 200 1 , pp.249). The amount of killings of members of the judiciary
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branch showed the capability of organized crime to destabilize the government. Later on,
in 1997 Carlos Castano managed to officially unify all these isolated local private armies
of anti-guerrilla resistance across the country into the United Self-Defense of Colombia
(AUC), whose ideals were also congruent with some of the United States
counterinsurgency strategies. At this point it is important to recall the involvement of the
AUC with the illicit drugs trafficking, since ..a 1998 classified document by the
Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad" (DAS) listed Colombia's top paramilitary

leader, Carlos Castano, as a well-known drug trafficker" (Bibes, 2001, pp.249)
After the 1988 elections, the remaining members of the UP retired completely
from politics, ended up in exile, or went back to the jungle to fight together with the
FARC. After this political genocide, President Gaviria tried to get the FARC to enter
dialogue for another peace process in 1999. This initiative wasn't able to succeed due to
the lack of willingness from the Colombian government to discuss economic policies. At
this point the FARC were able to sustain their subversive activities by obtaining funding
from illicit activities. They were now economically independent, which means that public
support was not their main funding factor anymore. The profits the FARC made thanks to
this business helps to explain their expansion in the 80s decade. The drug industry
improved the FARC's economic situation by adding to their source of revenue based on
kidnapping, extortion and racketeering.
The independence of the FARC gave them an advantage in terms of having
enough power to bring issues like the need for an agrarian reform and a new peace
process to the government. By the early 2000s, the FARC were organized enough to be
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able to afford to not settle for anything less than they were asking for. They remained
faithful to their declaration in the FARC's Eighth Conference in 1 993 to oppose the
neoliberal economic policies that were being implemented in Colombia, and they would
not settle on dialogues unless security guarantees and discussions of the economic policy
were part of the negotiation agenda.
As a matter of fact, the Colombian government remained supportive of that
neoliberal policy by letting it be the driving factor of the third agrarian refonn. This
refonn was intended to be "market-led," which implied that it would be based on
"voluntary transactions in which land is bought and sold for immediate cash payments at
market prices" (Holmes, 20 I 0, pp.342). But the efficiency of this agrarian reform was
doubtful, since only 10 percent of the planned 1 million hectares available were
distributed. Market-based priced lands were not a possibility for a struggling poor peasant
class. In 2005, President Alvaro Uribe implemented the agrarian counter- refonn, which
was mainly in favor of the wealthy landowning class that it represented. This reform also
included a prioritization of export crops and the utilization of land for biofuel production.
Uribe also bad a significant impact on the direction of the armed conflict through his
"Democratic Security" policy to put an end to it through an intensified military offensive.
Given the assumption that the FARC were a subversive leftist group, heavily involved
with narcotraffic as well as a highly dangerous actor, Uribe proposed to put an end to the
conflict by using a heavily militarized hard power approach to settle the conflict. He was
a defender of security, which was the state-level cornerstone that the FARC was
threatening. Uribe also manifested that his approach intended to support the security
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approach through electoral democracy, public opinion consensus, since the FARC were
also an obstacle to the fulfilment of truly democratic practices in Colombia. This military
approach to the conflict resonated with the historical system of alliance between the
United States and Colombia, when an internal situation in Colombia becomes a national
security threat for the United States. In this sense, massive U.S. assistance began in 1989
under the pretext of a ''war on drugs," when presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan
attributed the proliferation of illicit crops to the Medellin cartel. Later, in 2000 President
Clinton signed into law the first instalment of Plan Colombia, which authorized a
package for the sum of 860.3 million of which 75 percent were to be designated to
security. In 2003, Latin America is considered the most affected region in terms of
domestic terrorism, and "as a result, US concerns in the region refer to the possibility that
structural deficiencies and the rise of illegal activities" (Prevost, 2014, pp.20)as a direct
threat to their national security. The U.S. funding was invested "too heavily in helicopters
and military hardware, instead of support for civil society, democratic institutions and
human rights defendants." (Prevost, 2014, pp.166). This is proof of the how the economic
support of the United States was important in order to sustain the war on terror under the
claim of protecting the national security of Colombia, the United States and, implicitly,
the national security of the entire region. The costs of this approach implied hundreds of
deaths that continued until in 2012, former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos took
advantage of the FARC's weakened position to begin a process to settle the conflict
through a more structured, peaceful way. The document that marked the beginning of the
peace process was signed the 26 of August of 2012 in Cuba.
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One can arguably say that Uribe's heavily militarized approach against the FARC
in order to prevent them from claiming their political rights is counterproductive of the
essence of the representative principle of democracy. However, the militarized approach
built on the public opinion regarding who the FARC were in the beginning of the XXI
century, compared to who they were in 1964 when they first started. Their offensive
violent approach to achieve their means (due to the government's denial for them to
participate in the government decision making processes through democratic means)
translated into a criminal image, their involvement with illicit crops turned them into drug
dealers, and their leftist ideology translated into an immediate threat to democracy. This
last element was also fuelled by the public opinion's fear of Colombia following the steps
of Venezuela if the left was allowed in power. All of these elements contributed to a poor
image in the view of Colombian public opinion, who only knew as much about the FARC
as the mass media allowed them to. Additionally, there has been an ingrained fear of the
left, mainly rooted in the Cold War US- influenced context, to rise to power all through
the history of Colombia. In this sense, the fears of the Colombian population formed the
basis of public opinion. It is also important to recall that the Colombian civil society was
not aware of the implications of the

responses of the Colombian government that

included sponsoring paramilitary groups (responsible for the largest share of civilian
killings), or decision making processes based on narcotraffic money. In fact, they were
not aware that "the paramilitaries are pro-governmental with strong links with the state"
(Sanin, 2008, pp.6). There was a common enemy between the government and the
paramilitary forces in their initial stages of formation, that being the leftist-oriented
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guerrillas. Therefore, due to the paramilitary success, "a number of Colombian army
officers tolerated and encouraged them. This included the provision of intelligence and
weapons, as well as putting them in touch with retired officers who provided training and
technical assistance."(Spencer, 2001, pp.6). Whether or not the government recognized
publicly the legitimacy of the paramilitaries and their actions against the FARC and ELN,
the fact is that it was aware of their existence and allowed their operations. Furthermore,
the Human Rights Watch gathered evidence that suggested that there was a clear alliance
between the Colombian armed forces and the paramilitaries in 2000. There has been
proof that "the Third Brigade provided the Calima Front with weapons and intelligence."
(Human Rights Watch, 2000). There have also been claims that "Among the alleged
paramilitaries Attorney General investigators told Human Rights Watch enjoyed free
access to Fourth Brigade headquarters in 1997 and 1998 was Jacinto Alberto Soto, known
as "Lucas" and believed to act as the ACCU's accountant" (Human Rights Watch, 2000).
There is also evidence of a joint paramilitary-army attack to the village of El Aro with the
goal of emptying the area, since it was believed that it was full of FARC supporters.
Witnesses affirm that it was the paramilitaries entering the village while the Colombian
army surrounded the area.
However, the civil population was never aware of the rural areas' situation. Due
to the geographic disconnect between urban and rural areas, it was hard for Colombians
to perceive the conflict in terms of its origins and how it developed, because the
information that they received was also biased by the main media channels owned by the
country's bourgeoisie and political elites for decades. For example, one of the main
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newspapers circulating in the urban areas, "El Tiempo/' and the main national TV
channel "Caracol/' were owned by one of the most politically active families: The
Santos. This explains the negative public opinion view of the paramilitaries and the
leftist-guerrillas in contrast with their support for the Colombian armed forces.

Complexities of the Colombian Peace Process Compared to other Latin American
Processes
President Juan Manuel Santos' approach recognized the underlying issues that an
armed settlement of the conflict could not address. Santos's government was facing a
peace process far more complex than the previous processes in Latin America in terms of
achieving a consensus from all parties on a set of viable solutions. This is due to the lack
of trust by the FARC of the Colombian government's capabilities to respect the
agreement and follow through, given the precedent of three previously failed peace
processes. Another issue that added complexity to the peace process was the involvement
of the illicit drugs issue, as well as the amount of additional stakeholders involved such as
the private sector, the Afro-Colombian and indigenous population, the rural populations,
and foreign government intervention.

For this analysis we may refer to Preti's

understanding of conflict as a whole. If one was to break down the nature of the
Colombian armed conflict, one must then include an analysis on the causes of the conflict
as well as the functionality (for the armed actors) that allowed it to sustain itself for half a
century. Speaking in terms of structural causes, one may attribute the conflict to the
unequal conditions experienced in rural areas. First, the issue of land distribution has
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been transcendent throughout Colombian history since independence. This is due to the
legacy carried from the colonial period, when wealthy landowners had the power over
extensive territories. As a consequence of this, peasants were bound by this system where
they had to work for their "pancoger" (subsistence) for the landowner or work in their
small lots for sustenance. Second, peasants suffered from the lack of state presence that
neglected the right of small landowners to protection from landowner abuses and attacks,
as well as lack of an effective judicial system to punish the perpetrators. Third, the lack of
state presence also was reflected in the lack of public investment in rural infrastructure,
education, healthcare and agricultural technification. This was a major issue once
peasants could no longer support themselves due to their disadvantaged position in the
markets compared to the foreign industrial companies. The economic decline of the rural
areas has a lot to do with the neoliberal policies implemented since the 1980s for the
convenience of transnational corporations. Fourth, the violent repressive response from
the state to the self-defense campesino communities' claims, allowed the latter to evolve
their self defense nature towards an offensive strategy to use violence as a mean to get
their claims heard. These structural causes were not properly addressed.
We see a common denominator in all Latin American conflicts where their origins
can be tracked to similar structural causes. This is true especially for the land question
and the highly repressive regimes that aimed to quiet the voice of the people and establish
order by violent means. Guatemala and El Salvador had similar initial points where
campesinos started to organize themselves into armed groups to voice their concerns as a
response to a highly repressive regime. However, none of these previous armed conflicts
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lasted as long as the Colombian conflict has. There are several factors that contribute to
this outcome. The dynamics in the rural areas involving private armies hired by
conservative landowners allowed for the Colombian government to further utilize and
transform these groups into part of the counter-insurgency strategy, the paramilitary
forces. This strategy gave the Colombian government the possibility to advise
unconstitutional war strategies through the AUC without the direct involvement of the
legitimate Colombian army. This made state accountability difficult to take place. Most
of the repressive regimes in Latin America were led by the armed forces of each country,
as is the case in El Salvador. Nicaragua, on the other hand, used the contras to fight the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The

contras

were a US-backed and

sponsored group, which means that the responsibility of these actions does not rely
exclusively on Nicaraguan domestic actors as is the case of the paramilitary forces in
Colombia. In addition to the appearance of a third armed actor (AUC), the sustained
nature of the conflict can also be attributed to illicit crops as the source of funding for the
FARC and the AUC. This allowed the irregular armed groups to keep funding their
operations for decades. As a final combination of the previous factors, the end result was
that highly corrupted legal institutions received economic remunerations in favor of
sponsoring the "parapolitics" or the "narco-politics."
At this point it's important to bring up Preti's functionality approach, in the sense
that the armed conflict began to have a functional benefit to all the parties involved once
they realized that they could achieve their own agendas through it. It was precisely the
functionality of the conflict for each individual party that prevented them from achieving
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a consensus to put an end to it. Ironically, each party's actions were legitimized by the
offensive actions of the other parties. This also resulted in an interactive dynamic of
cycles of violence where the rule of law was broken down in parts of the territory,
justifying opportunistic use of violence rather than the use of violence based on political
reasons. The end of the conflict implied that the justification for engaging in profitable
yet unethical actions was not present anymore for the Colombian government and the
paramilitaries. This means that any attack from the government or the paramilitaries
against the people in the rural areas under the excuse of them being subversive organized
forces like the FARC, could seem illegitimate due to the "end of the conflict" and the
removal of the FARC as an armed actor since it's now conceptually a political party.
However, It's also important to keep in mind that actions may be taken against dissident
members of the FARC that did not tum in their weapons or returned to illicit activities.
In the case of the Colombian government, the presence of an armed group that could be
labeled as a terrorist criminal organization legitimized their reluctance in engaging in
reforms addressing the structural causes that the FARC was advocating for. After the The
use of violence from the campesino self-defenses allowed the transformation of a social
justice issue into a military enterprise. The government could guard their interests in
terms of land by using the monopoly of armed forces against those who voiced their
concerns in the rural areas by categorizing them as leftist-criminals. The paramilitaries
were taking advantage of the economic remunerations from landowners and drug dealers
as well as the support of the Colombian government by fighting the FARC, as well as
getting their agenda through the Colombian legal institutions due to the fact that they
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were handling the military side of the anti-communist fight,together with the neoliberal
political reality of Colombia in the 1980s . Lastly, the FARC had also a legitimate excuse
to use their anned capabilities to fight a system that made it impossible for them to
accomplish their political and social agenda, while also remunerating themselves from
illicit crop activities.
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CHAPTER IV: THE PEACE ACCORD AND ITS CHALLENGES

The 2016 Peace Agreement
After four years of negotiation, the Colombian government and the FARC
representatives reached a hard-won peace agreement. The peace negotiations started in
September of 2012 in Havana, Cuba. The General Agreement for the Termination of the
Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace was signed as a roadmap to
follow through and conduct the peace talks. These peace talks intended to address larger
structural issues that could not be addressed only by the end of the conflict. The
exploratory meetings of the Colombian government and the FARC representatives led to
six main points of discussion: integral rural development, political participation, end of
conflict, solution to the issue of illicit drugs, ratification, implementation and verification.
Santos recognized that a belligerent approach to war would only keep perpetuating the
conflict instead of settling a dialogue where both parties could advocate for their
interests.
As described in Chapter 1, there are several complications when it comes to
settling the grounds for the post-conflict. One of these areas of discussion is the
prevalence of the economic interests of different groups that can be factors that fuel the
conflict. In the case of Colombia, there has been a conflict of interests among the
regulations on the use of land. The new post-conflict economic alternatives regarding the
land must be more appealing to all stakeholders, especially to those sectors of population
that had to resort to illegal and illicit activities during the conflict, so that they don't resort
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to their old practices in the post-conflict period. It is also important to recall the attempt
of the PARC leaders to fight neoliberalism as the economic policy that will address
poverty and inequality, particularly after the post conflict. Additionally, the unequal
arrangements regarding the rural areas combined with a repressive response from the
government as a solution to the peasants' claims has been one of the major structural
causes of the conflict. The issue of land distribution, technification of rural agriculture,
lack of basic services like education and healthcare, and violent confrontations between
the government and armed actors have not only hindered the development of rural areas,
but also contribute to the apparent lack of attractiveness of Colombia's economy to
foreign capital due to the additional cost of the damages to infrastructure and roads that
the armed groups' attacks caused. It was to the advantage of the Santos administration to
settle the conflict in the most effective way before its presidential period was over, even if
that meant compromising the traditional elite interests that facilitated the prolongation of
it during the negotiation process. Just as in the Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador's
peace accords, the fact that there has been a settlement of an agreement discussing the
relevant issues to put an end to conflict does not guarantee that these solutions are going
to be immediately implemented.
Other important comparative variables in the post-conflict peace-building have
been brought up by various academics regarding the different areas of the state that were
affected by the conflict. When it comes to the judiciary branch to account for the rights of
the victims and the accountability of the perpetrators, it is important to consider the
matter of transitional justice in the post conflict period. Transitional justice refers to the
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challenge of "how to make one-off moral compromises during transitions without these
becoming precedents for shaping the new society; and second, how to build a foundation
for future justice in the context of the denial of justice during the transitional period."
(Van der Merwe, 2016, pp. 361). In other words, its short term application during the
transition will shape the prospects for long term stability. Another challenge of building a
peaceful post-conflict society involves the participation of civil society in building such
context in the long term. A post conflict society must see a shift from the previous
oppressive structures present during the conflict context. In this sense, transformative
justice can help to bring about a "change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the
prioritization of process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of
unequal and intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local
and the global level" (McGill, 2017, pp.88). The application of these different approaches
in the process of implementing the Colombian peace agreement will be discussed in this
chapter.
In terms of content of the peace accords, it is evident that the FARC negotiators
made a point to include all the factors that fostered these structural inequalities, which the
Colombian government finally consented to include. In fact, the first point of the peace
accords addresses the land issues in terms of distributing three million hectares to the
rural population. This point focused on the redistribution of lands with no title, unduly
appropriated or occupied. It also attempts to increase the environmental regulations
regarding the use of forests and the protection of the ecological interests of the country.
These lands are meant to be distributed mainly to rural women and displaced people to
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ensure their sustainability. This point of the accord, the comprehensive rural reform, also
ensures that there will be measures taken to enhance the use of land in terms of seed
capital and technical assistance, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for
productivity such as roadways, irrigation system, healthcare, education, housing and
market access. The Comprehensive Rural Reform " must successfully

achieve

an

in-depth transformation of the rural situation in Colombia: greater inclusion at a regional
level, eradication of poverty, greater equality and

guaranteed

full

enjoyment

of

citizens' rightsand, as a result, guaranteed non-recurrence of the conflict and eradication
of violence." (Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Long
Lasting Peace, 2017, pp. I 0). It is important to recognize how the Colombian government
phrased the "structural transformation" of the rural areas in the Final Agreement in terms
of abstract values of "fairness, equality and democracy" instead of mentioning structural
re-distribution of land, which is one of the main historical sources of conflict in
Colombia. The Agreement mentions that there will be a democratization of the use of
land "Land Fund for the CRR (3 million hectares) and section 1.1.5. Large-Scale Rural
Property Titling (7 million hectares), the next 12 years will see an extension under the
Comprehensive Rural Reform to 10 million hectares...the goal of land titling will be
achieved within the next 10 years and the land titling within the DPTFs within the next
seven years" (Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Long
Lasting Peace, 2017, pp.13). The terms of this redistribution are not included in the
peace accords. Just like in the case of Guatemala, the land redistribution task is
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designated to a special rural and legal system that was not clearly defined at the time the
accords were signed.
It is important to recall that according to the Peace Agreement, the land reform is
gomg to involve active participation from the rural population, promoting dialogue
mechanisms between the government and the communities. The accord proposes the
incorporation of programs that will help to define the agricultural frontier and strengthen
the rural economy through the Farmer Enterprise Zones (Zonas de Reserva Campesina).
This new land reform would be carried out in a way that rural areas are given the
necessary tools in order to compete with globalization as well as partake in the national
economy. The Agreement also makes it a goal to eradicate extreme poverty and reduce
rural poverty by 50%. It is clear that the Colombian government has proposed an attempt
to fulfill these goals, but if one was to track the actual steps taken by the government to
implement and proactively seek their achievement, one must look at the economic
indicators of the rural areas that have been affected by the conflict. In the example of the
communities in the Northern Cauca where around 80% of the population is poor, there is
64% unemployment and 21 % of the population cannot write or read, and claims for
education and health reforms have not been addressed by the government. An example of
the government's response to these claims that should have been addressed by the
implementation of the Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) were taken care of by the
government by the construction of a municipal high school in the area which was never
finished, or by attempting to move the people to government-funded housing, to remove
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them from areas of economic interest. Such was the case of the communities m
Kilometro 9, La Esperanza and San Juan.
Additionally leaders of these communities like Rodrigo Castillo stated to
members of the Witness for Peace Delegation in 2017 on an interview: "we cannot
complain, the most violent one is the state." (Castillo, R. personal communication, July
16, 2017). Looking at the economic indicators of Colombia, the organization Colombia
Reports shows that the poverty rate of Colombia has decreased from 28% to 26.4% from
2016 to 2017. It is also important to note that the rural poverty rate has decreased from
38% to 36% in the last year. (Colombia Reports, 2017). It would be relevant to the
following mechanisms to further investigate which indicators are being measured and see
if they are truly reflective of the condition of the people in the rural areas.
The second point addressed by the peace agreement involves the political
participation of the parties that would be representing the FARC's interest in the political
arena. This agreement made sure to address rights and guarantees for the political
opposition. There also seemed to be a commitment from the Colombian government to
guarantee security measures for ex-FARC combatants, leaders of social organizations and
human rights advocates. This point also tries to cover democratic mechanisms for citizen
participation in the form of a National Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence to
engage citizens in reconciliation, anti-stigmatization and diversity awareness program. In
order to guarantee transparency in the democratic procedural practices, the Colombian
government also advised the creation of city oversight boards and the involvement of
watchdog organizations. In order to engage the civil society in the democratic practice,
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the Colombian government has committed to execute educational programs about
democracy and political and social organizations and for the promotion of leadership of
women in politics. In other words, building what the United Nations calls "cultures of
peace."
The third point addressed by the Colombian government has to do with ensuring a
long-lasting end to the conflict. This section included the terms of the bilateral, definitive
ceasefire and terms in which the laying down of arms was supposed to happen. The
accord proposed a transitional space for the FARC-EP members to lay down their
weapons, the Transitional Local Zones of Normalization. The settlement of these areas
included certain guarantees from the government such as safety protocols for the safe
transportation, handling, storage and control of the weapons, ammunitions and explosives
of the FARC-EP. As a second part of this point, the government designed a plan for the
reincorporation of the FARC-EP members to the civilian life and political matters. The
FARC members who lay down arms would be granted special measures of security and
care, especially the minors who were involved in the armed combat. The political
reincorporation would ensure that the FARC's right as a political party is recognized; this
measure also includes the designation of S seats for the FARC in each chamber of the
Colombian Congress. The economic and social reincorporation of the FARC will also
include programs of socially productive and environmental programs, as well of a
conditional monthly basic wage corresponding to 90% of the national minimum wage.
The government also commits to give the demobilized FARC-EP members access to
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education, housing, culture, sports and recreation, psycho-social care and family
reunification plans and programs.
The fourth point of the agreement discusses the solution to the illicit drugs issue.
The accords address Creating a National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of
Crops Used of Illicit Purposes (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustituci6n de Cultivos de
Uso Ilicito - PNIS), as a chapter of the Comprehensive Rural Reform (Reforma Rural
Integral - RRI). This institution would be in charge of making sure that there is an
appropriate substitution program that would provide alternative beneficial opportunities
to drug-crops to the peasants in the rural communities. There would also be an
intensification of the fight against criminal organizations engaged in drug trafficking, as
well as stricter policies regarding regulating the chemicals used to process drugs.
The fifth point addressed the armed conflict victims' rights in terms of truth,
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. One of the first measures taken by
the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition Commission (Comisi6n para el
Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetici6n). This entity would be
in charge of advocating for the realization of the right of truth to the victims as well as
their recognition. One of the most controversial points of this section is the creation of the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz), which would
investigate and punish cases of crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict.
This was an important source of discontent among the public opinion which resulted in
the failure of the October 2, 2016 referendum to ratify the peace accords, due to the lack
of accountability of perpetrators of human rights abuses which translated into a legal
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framework fostering impunity. The revised accord (which was approved by Congress on
November 30, 2016, but not submitted to referendum) stated that crimes such as crimes
against humanity, genocide, serious war crimes, hostage taking, kidnapping of civilians,
torture, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances and sexual violence would not be
subject to amnesty or pardon. The accords promise comprehensive measures for
peacebuilding purposes such as collective land reparation, development programs, return
of displaced persons, land restitution and the promotion of social-coexistence. It is
important to note that this point is impossible to implement without the effective
fulfillment of the previous points of the agreement. The Colombian government
committed to protecting the right to peace in areas most affected by the conflict.
The final point is the implementation and verification mechanisms. The accord
creates an Implementation, Follow-up, Verification, and Dispute Resolution Commission
for the Final Agreement (Comisi6n de implementaci6n, seguimiento y verificacion del
Acuerdo Final de Paz y la resoluci6n de diferencias - CSVR). This commission will run
on a 10-year basis and would be in charge of the fulfilment of all the points discussed in
the agreement. As a result, this commission will produce a Final Agreement that will be
prepared over two presidential periods, which shall be included in the National
Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo - PND). However, this measure is hard
to guarantee because of the institutional uncertainty that the May 27, 2018 presidential
election will bring. This commission will also make sure to address funding mechanisms
for the implementation of the peace accords. This is going to come mostly from the
General Transfer System (Sistema General de Participaciones) and the General Royalties
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System (Sistema General de Regalias). This point also includes different measures to
ensure transparency and consistency with the terms accorded in order to build a long
lasting peace. Colombia's High Council for the Post-conflict states that the cost of the
implementation of the peace accords is around $42.5 billion over the course of 15-20
years.
Given the limited economic resources for the Colombian government to cover the
complete costs of the agreement, the role of foreign donors will be important, especially
the EU Trust Fund for Colombia, which is set to have a sum of 95 million Euros to help
Colombia implement the peace agreement in the early recovery stages and secure a stable
and lasting peace. The United States has also contributed funds to finance the
implementation of the peace accords, through the Peace Colombia program, increasing
funds 25% compared to those available for Colombia in 2016. Another source of
donations from the United States is the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), which also attempts to address social and development
challenges among the private sector, the Colombian government and the rural areas.
Colombia also has received funding from the World Bank and the United Nations.
However, according, "the amount received by foreign actors is estimated to be no more
than 9% of the total funding needed"(Ballesteros, 2017)

Implementation Challenges: From Paper to Reality

Even though it has been over a year since the peace agreement was signed, the
effectiveness of the application of this peace can begin to be evaluated in terms of the
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initial level of commitment from the Colombian government in terms of implementing
the peace process. The Colombian peace process has been acclaimed internationally
based on its written content, however, it is important to make a distinction between the
image that the international community is perceiving based on the content of the
agreement and its domestic perception based on the implementation. There are several
short-term points of the agreement that have not been properly implemented, and this can
cause serious repercussions when it comes to the establishment of a long lasting peace in
Colombia. A successful implementation of the peace accords in a way that the
govemmenfs actions stay loyal to the object and purpose of the peace treaty, will
necessarily challenge the dominant political and social structure. In this sense, modest
reforms will be useless to establish a long term peace unless these are implemented
progressively with the aim of changing the system.
When it comes to the land reform, the coalition of political and social groups
including landowners, cattle ranchers, agribusiness elites and extractive multinational
corporations keep engaging in continuous efforts to stymie implementation of the accord.
The relevance of the land point of the peace agreement is that if properly implemented,
an integral agrarian reform will challenge the status quo that has been ruling the
Colombian political and social context since the colonial period. Even though the
agreement provides that land would be redistributed, protected and better managed, we
still see the government delegitimizing the agreement by taking little initiative to put the
rural population socio-economic interests over the transnational corporations' agenda. In
the specific example of the community La Esperanza, the local inhabitants told Witness
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for Peace delegates on an interview that they were not allowed to extract wood from the
forests since the territory where their community lives was declared a national forest
reserve, while foreign companies are allowed to do so(Interview, July 17, 2017). Another
example is the Communities of K.ilometro 9, who claim to have been displaced by the
crowd control forces of Colombia (ESMAD) from their houses so that their lands could
be used to build a road for transnational companies to be able to transport their goods
from the port of Buenaventura. This is a common issue affecting returning indigenous
and Afro-Colombian communities. These communities need more serious forms of
protection for their land rights as well as the security of their community leaders and
social activists. There needs to be an acceleration of the creation of the strengthening of
the rural legal system to process and address such claims. In this sense, there would
actually be a creation of territorial regulations in order to promote dialogue between
government and the people as agreed in the accord regarding the use and distribution of
the land.
In terms of political participation, one of the main challenges that the
implementation of this peace agreement has struggled with has to do with the social and
political atomization of the country, based on a deep tradition of exclusion and fear of the
leftist ideology. The peaceful inclusion of the left into the political system has to do
significantly with the levels of acceptance from public opinion of the idea of the FARC
participating in political decisions. This can be seen in the "Observatory of Democracies"
surveys, where even though 67% of the Colombian population agreed to a negotiated
peace, only 41% supported a negotiated peace accords with the FARC. In fact, the
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percent of trust by the civil population towards the FARC did not go over 7% in 2016
(Galvis, N, 2016, pp.25). However, this type of project of rebuilding trust and engaging
the civil society in a democratic culture is hard to achieve due to the members of the "no
campaign" sponsored by former President Alvaro Uribe. Without political unity, the
promise of social unity is hard to achieve. The accord's aim to address the historical past
of the country based on a coexistence approach has become hard to implement, when the
stigma around ex-members of the FARC follows them in the political and social spheres.
One could argue that the results of the 2016 referendum are reflective of this political
fragmentation that led to a social fragmentation, taking place in a context of poor
democratic culture. The fact that only 40% of the Colombian population participated in
the referendum was reflective of a poor democratic culture, combined with the lack of
enabling mechanisms from the government to guarantee safe access to voting sites in face
of the different burdens that made it hard for people to vote (The Caribbean region faced
a hurricane that day). The polarized responses of the voting population could be
explained by the areas of influence that the "no campaign" had an impact on the public
opinion by advertising the peace accords as a way to give the country to the FARC, a
legal framework to enable the left to transform Colombia to be like Venezuela. Regions
like "Norte de Santander experienced misinformation campaigns led by locally influential
right-wing groups that emerged after the official demobilization of the paramilitary
umbrella organization AUC." (Idler, 2016). It is also interesting to note that those
departments that were most affected by the conflict voted yes, while those who were
geographically distant from the actual context of the conflict and urban areas that
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received the most influence of the mass media voted no. This is also another example of
the urban-rural divide in the country, a remaining structural obstacle to implementing a
sustainable peace.
The political participation of minorities and the rural communities that have been
most affected by the conflict still needs to be addressed. According to the Kroc Institute
Report by the University of Chicago, it is necessary to foster "the participation of
Afro-Colombian and indigenous minorities in peace accord implementation, particularly
monitoring the fulfillment of the promises contained in the accords" (Haugaard, 201 7).
The government must also re-build institutional trust by staying loyal to the agreement in
order to establish a solid democratic culture. In this sense, the legal processes regarding
investigation of disappeared persons and accountability of the perpetrators of human
rights abuses during the conflict must be upheld. The appropriate functioning of the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace is necessary as a preliminary step towards establishing a
long lasting peace.
The Colombian government has also lost a lot of credibility from the FARC
members with regard to implementing the third point of the peace accord. The failure to
reincorporate the former FARC-EP members is a detrimental factor to the long-term
stability of the country. This is especially true because the guarantees ofnon-repetition of
the conflict are also based on how well the Colombian government achieves the
incorporation of the former guerrilla members by giving them adequate guarantees such
as access to education, job training and healthcare, among other factors. This is
particularly important in terms of the Colombian government being able to provide
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security guarantees to them. There has been an underlying lack of trust coming from the
precedent set by the assassination of the UP candidates in the 1 980s during the period of
democratic elections. This fear has also been fueled by the amount of assassinations of
human rights activists in Colombia: The Guardian claims 201 7 as "The deadliest year on
record for human rights defenders in Colombia, with 1 2 1 human rights activists killed in
that year."(The Guardian, 201 7). The degree to which the Colombian government
commits to fulfilling the immediate needs of the demobilized FARC members will
determine whether or not they will return to the armed struggle as dissidents or engage in
other illicit activities to ensure their sustenance.
The international NGOs like WOLA and the Kroc Research Institute from the
University of Notre Dame have agreed that the handling of the illicit crops is one of the
weakest points in this agreement. This process does not incorporate international
verification mechanisms, making it hard to enforce the ''voluntary" character of the illicit
crop eradication. Cristian Delgado, who manages human rights for COCCAM, counted
27 of its members killed since January 2017. Participants in crop-substitution efforts have
been among a growing wave of social leaders killed in post-conflict Colombia."
(Washington Office for Latin America, 201 8).This blurry distinction has caused a
significant number of confrontations between the Colombian state forces and campesino
communities. Due to the lack of alternative economic opportunities, the campesino
communities refuse to allow the eradication of their drug crops. If coca, the only source
of income, is removed, then peasants are going to be left embedded in an unequal
economic system based on the lack of sustenance and market access opportunities. This
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explains the situation in the communities in San Pablo in Turnaco, where the crop
eradication process is running with no attempt to improve the quality of life of the
campesinos in tenns of infrastructure, substitution alternatives, electricity, access to
education and healthcare. The Latin American Bureau has claimed that in face of the
government's lack of compliance, "The campesinos of San Pablo did not just talk peace;
they are the ones building it. They communicated peacefully and willingly entered into
dialogue with an anned actor they previously hid from. Yet, as one of them said, 'the
state is not complying with what they agreed and offered us.' Those on the frontline of
conflict, at most risk of being marginalised or worse, are doing their part" (Chonan,
2017). The aggressive anti-narcotics policy has also been influenced by the US
government pressure due to its high demand for results, leaving the interests of the rural
communities aside in favor of the acceleration of the illicit crop eradication process.
The fifth point of the peace agreement has also been questionable when it comes
to its implementation. There is still so much to do for the victims of the conflict. A lot of
it has to do with the issues regarding the first point of the agreement. The distribution of
the land, and the respect for the rights of the victims of the conflict to a safe return to
their lands, has been an ongoing issue since the peace agreement was signed. Such is the
case of the people in the Kilometre 9 in Buenaventura, where returning victims and
Afro-Colombian peasants were kicked out of their land by the ESMAD (riot police) in
order to clear this territory for the settlement of extractive foreign enterprises' activities.
Or the case of the community of La Esperanza in the Cauca Department, where the
government fails to respect the collective title as part of the Victims Law and the right of
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the displaced people to have safe access to their lands, leaving them unprotected against
local violence, as well as refusing to respond to their legal claims regarding illegal
invasions of their assigned lands. The issue of security is still a major problem when it
comes to the previously mentioned communities as well as the populations living in the
"humanitarian spaces" (grassroots initiatives to create peace communities and exclude
armed actors even before the peace accords were negotiated), where the government was
supposed to protect the victims of the conflict from the remaining paramilitary forces.
This is a result of the remaining members of the demobilized AUC turning into infonnal
criminal bands (BACRIM) in the areas with low state presence. The lack of state
presence in these areas allows the BACRIM to operate freely and make use of the rural
populations as they choose. According to the delegation of Witness for Peace in July
2017 in Colombia, Henry Lopez Trujillo, a member of the neighborhood La Ballita in
Buenaventura claimed that the situation of the humanitarian space is getting worse every
day, and the government military forces are not protecting the community. The promises
of infrastructure improvements such as common green areas, hospitals, sewage systems
and schools have not been implemented, leaving the people in this communities living in
unsanitary conditions.
The right of truth to the victims has also been a weak point of the peace
agreement since the JEP (Special Peace Jurisdiction) is only covering the human rights
violations as well as cases of forced disappearances since the Alvaro Uribe
administration. This excludes the case of the "false-positives" from the investigation, in
which the military killed civilians and pretended they were armed rebels. The lack of

84

compliance from the Colombian government regarding the Truth and Reparation
principles has led communities like the ones in the center of the city of Cali, to take
historical memory and advocacy for truth into their own hands and denounce forced
disappearances and violent crimes against civilians through the Foundation GuaGua. Part
of this organization is in charge of secretly running the Gallery of Memory Tiberio
Fernandez, to honor the loss of those victims that have not been recognized or accounted
for the government. The secretive nature of this gallery is due to the well justified fear of
the community members to be labeled as insurgent opposition forces and be persecuted
by the government simply for preserving historical memory.
Apparently, the Colombian government has been using the ESMAD or public
control forces of the country to quiet the claims of the people from these rural, poor and
isolated regions where the civil society voices their discontent with the implementation of
the peace accords and the continued lack of fulfilment of their basic rights. A clear
example of this was the use of the ESMAD forces in the "paro civico" (general strike) of
last May, where the crowd control forces used gas bombs and rubber bullets in their
intervention against the peaceful protest of the people of Buenaventura regarding the
previously mentioned issues. The populations have 'found mass social movements to be
an alternative solution to taking up arms against the neglect of the state. Their situation
also worsens as there is no efficient mechanism that will prosecute the cases, where the
departmental authorities refuse to address the social needs of the people and further
infringe on their constitutional rights such as the right to land, security, education and
healthcare. Once again we see history repeating itself.
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At the macro-level, the Colombian government has made an attempt to address
structural violence in the form of the peace accords, however we see little effort to
achieve these goals at the micro level. Once again, the areas most affected by the conflict
struggle with holding the government accountable for their lack of compliance. The
government military forces seem to be more responsive to protecting the areas where
transnational corporate interest reside, than to ensure the security of the victims of the
conflict. An example of this is the community of the 9th Kilometer nearby Buenaventura.
Peasants claim to have been kicked out of their lands by the ESMAD forces so that these
land can be used for "mega projects" to better utilize Buenaventura's port, as well as to
harvest the forest for economic purposes. This can be associated with the interest for the
Colombian government in encouraging foreign investment, as part of its neoliberal
strategy to have greater participation in the international markets. However, the
protection of foreign enterprises in Colombia does not have to imply its prioritization
over the rural populations and victims of the conflict, to whom the majority of the peace
agreement was addressed. In this sense, one must start to look deeper into the intersection
of the economic resources that are needed to fulfill the points of the peace accords, the
use of land and the economic interests of the foreign multinational companies that have
an interest in extractive activities on Colombia's land. One of the determining factors for
the Colombian peace agreement to be successfully implemented, as well as one of the
main guarantees for a long lasting peace, is the tension between the protection of the rural
population's interests and the government's strategy for economic growth based on
neoliberal policy. It is possible to observe the negative implications of the adoption of
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strong neoliberal economic policies in the immediate post-conflict context in the cases of
El Salvador and Guatemala. In fact, in the case of El Salvador, the neoliberal model left
Salvadoran people with no option but to try to explore different means of sustenance
through migration to other countries due to the lack of economic opportunity for the local
people. "The failure of the neoliberal model to develop a productive, self-sufficient
economy is creating forced migration in numbers greater than during the war" (Wade,
2008, pp. 24). Wade also claims that "The Cristiani administration's refusal to take a
more holistic approach to the peace process in terms of the failure to address
socio-economic problems or to appropriately assess incompatibility of the neoliberal
model despite not only popular opposition to it" (Wade, 2008, pp. 29), a symptom of a
future socio-economic crisis. In the case of Guatemala, there "is a state form
characterized by its postconflict and neoliberal aspects, one that reflects a continuity of
wartime power and violence alongside an economic reorientation toward the facilitation
of transnational capital accumulation . . . .Just as the neoliberal right used the peace process
to create a favorable economic context, the Guatemalan armed forces also navigated the
transition to ensure a continuity of power" (Granovski-Larsen, 2017, pp.57). In other
words, the elites and foreign capital made a profitable transition from armed conflict to
{negative) peace.
These countries have now the lowest economic indicators in Latin America as
well as the lowest literacy rates, Human Development Index and the highest infant
mortality rates. This is due to the unregulated penetration of foreign companies in the
form of extractive economic activities in the same areas where the victims of the conflict,
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peasants and indigenous populations struggle for their sustenance. In this sense, the
Colombian government should focus on addressing the short term economic and social
needs of the departments of Antioquia, Meta, Caqueta, Cordoba, Cauca and Valle del
Cauca while building strong institutions that can support the new rural judicial system, as
well as accountable courts, while fostering economic growth. A long lasting peace can
only be achieved by meeting short-term goals for the Colombian government to earn
institutional trust, and building a national political culture based on tolerance and civic
engagement.
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CHAPTER V: A Holistic Grassroots-Based Approach to Peace
Neoliberalism and Peace
When it comes to achieving a sustainable peace in a post-conflict context, the
economic aid that will allow funding for the execution of the peace agenda becomes a
relevant factor to a long term peace. The economic side of the post-conflict context is
going to determine what projects can be afforded and the market conditions under which
the new societal order operates. In the case of Colombia's peace agreement, the fact that
there is a signed peace accord does not imply its immediate execution. It is in fact the
ability of the Colombian government to fulfill the short-term basic needs of the people,
that will progressively build a long lasting peace. In this sense, the conditions that
facilitate the affordability of the terms of the Colombian Peace Accords are going to be a
necessary factor to guarantee stability.
The economic actors of the conflict and how they interact in the post conflict
context needs to be further detailed. It is clear that the main economic actors in the post
conflict are going to have a big influence on the way the post-conflict peace is built. The
previous chapter discussed how the reparations and illicit drugs components of the
agreement were among the weakest in terms of implementation. This is due to the clash
between the immediate interests of the private sector (industrialized extractivist activities
and a push for neoliberal policies) and the interests of the Afro-Colombian, indigenous
and peasant groups (implementation of their rights to land, reparations, and increased
political participation) since they share a geographic location: The Colombian rural
areas. The influence of the private sector has a big impact on the peace building process,
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since its extractive or development activities take place in the same location where the
less advantaged populations of Colombia are settled. In the case of Colombia, the
relationship between the economic elites and the political elites is very close, since these
political elite members often are closely linked with private enterprises and large amounts
of land. Based on the neoliberal paradigm, the Colombian state should give free rein to
extractive activities from the private sector, however the entrenching of a neoliberal
economy in Colombia could have counter-productive implications for long term peace.
This is a convenient paradigm for the Colombian elites, since their economic activities
could be undertaken with the least amount of regulation. In this sense it is important to
clarify the functionality of the conflict in terms the costs of conflict vs. the cost of peace
as reasons for the private sector to agree to support the end of it. According to Rettberg,
the cost of conflict implied an inconvenience to different private-sector stakeholders since
the "actual and perceived costs of conflict include levels of kidnapping, extortion,
domestic physical destruction and a general sense of (insecurity, as well as international
pressure via sanctions or conditional loans and credits" (Rettberg, 2007, pp. 465). The
private sector has had to face some costs of the conflict such as "repeated destruction of
infrastructure such as energy and communication towers and roads, and members of the
private sector are preferred targets of kidnappings and other types of extortion" (Rettberg,
2007, pp.484). On the other hand, there is also a significant cost of peace: "Costs of peace
include new taxation to support reconstruction efforts, while gains of peace refer to new
investment and saving opportunities which have been difficult or impossible to realise
due to the conflict" (Rettberg, 2007, pp.465) for the government. The costs of peace
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would mostly be afforded by the public, while the gains of peace will be accumulated by
the private sector and economic elites. The question then becomes, what cost are the
Colombian economic and political elites willing to pay.
While engaging in this utilitarian analysis, it appears that neoliberal market
operations would be further fostered if they took place in a conflict free environment. The
most convenient solution for the highly politically influential private sector would be to
settle the conflict in a way that they can still perform their extractive and economic
activities, without having to afford security costs or deal with the overall impact that the
conflict brings to the economy. It is important to recognize the agency that the private
sector has in the post-conflict context and "consider how historical and institutional
contexts lead to differences in the organisation of the private sector and the makeup of
business-politics relations" (Rettberg, 2007, pp.494).

The Private Sector� Role in the Colombian Post-Conflict
Part of the success of the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in
Colombia, while other Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile or Argentina are
talcing a different protectionist approach to their markets, is the influence that the United
States has had in the country's political system. The liberalization of trade from Colombia
benefited significantly U.S. enterprises. "The trade liberalisation process was
accompanied by an increase in financial capital flows, which absorbed resources from
other sectors of the economy, primarily those destined to the provision of social rights
(for example social protection programmes). This in tum increased the volatility and
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vulnerability of the economy and led to a financialization of the economy and public
policies, through the creation of policies aimed to guarantee financial stability and the
rapid privatization of health, pension, and education sectors, which depend increasingly
on financial actors, such as private pension funds." (Forero, n.d, pp.4). The beneficiaries
of this type of policy were the political-economic elites as well as U.S. transnational
companies.
This influence was intensified by "the role of transnational lobbying by US and
Colombian policy-makers, as well as the influence of transnational corporations all
played instrumental roles in the initiation, development and implementation of Plan
Colombia." (Aviles, 2008, pp.410). "Policies were also put in place to offer legal and
physical security for foreign investments, a policy called "searching for investor
confidence

through

democratic

security,"

which

ultimately

guaranteed

the

territorialization of transnational capital in Colombia" (Forero, n.d, pp.4). The basis of
this relationship was to foster Colombia's economic growth through the incorporation of
the economy into the global market. This type of trade relationship between the two
countries was formalized by the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement signed with the
United States in 2006. It is also important to recall the implications for the Colombian
rural elites, contributing to Colombia's economic growth by exploiting one of the main
sectors of the Colombian economy which is the exploitation of natural resources. The
terms of this agreement did not benefit the economic activities of the rural areas since
there was no increase in the export market for Colombia in the U.S. "The numbers
indicate that, contrary to what was said by the defenders of the treaty, Colombia has not
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increased its exports to the United States, the opposite is true, they have drastically
dropped from about $21 billion 969 million dollars to $9 billion 842 million in 2015,"
said Senator Jorge Enrique Robledo, from the leftist Democratic Pole." (Telesur, 2016).
However, given the armed conflict that Colombia had gone through, together with
the high production of illicit crops that fueled it, it was difficult to talk about economic
incorporation in the midst of instability which translated into risky investments for
transnational corporations. In this sense, the United States "contributed to Colombia's
strategy, which prioritised the militarisation of the counter-narcotics struggle in an effort
to establish the rule of law in those regions of Colombia deemed crucial to success in the

•us

drug war" (Aviles, 2008, pp.410). In other words, U.S.-led military escalation

displaced rural populations and cleared the way for profitable investment by
multinational corporations. It's also important to recognize how the Colombian conflict
had an effect on the performance of the U.S. economic enterprises in the country.
This militarized approach towards the eradication of illicit crops directed by
neoliberal political elites within Colombia and the USA, transnational policy-making
organisations and transnational corporations (TNCs), allowed the United States to claim
it was targeting the high inflows of illicit drugs to the U.S., as well as to settle the
grounds for further economic intervention once instability was settled. Aviles then argues
that "Any potential threat to US imperial control over the region's natural resources or
challenge to the principle of open markets must be addressed through the repression of a
guerrilla insurgency and its peasant supporters. According to this perspective, defending
US imperialism is the central aim of Plan Colombia and not counter-narcotics." (Aviles,
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2008, pp.412) This explains the questionable actions of the Colombian government while
utilizing its coercive force deliberately in aims of providing a quick solution to the
country's drug production. The production of illicit crops is not an isolated event that
takes in a vacuum, therefore a solution to this problem cannot be only addressed to the
production of illicit crops itself. Peasants had to engage in the illicit crop production due
to the lack of opportunities to compete in the national and international market with their
cash crops and to gain enough to sustain their living with the subsistence crops.
Furthermore, the impacts of the methods of eradication promoted by the United States
proved to be ineffective and harmful to the poor peasants that engage in these activities.
"Despite official claims to the contrary, aerial eradication does not significantly reduce
coca cultivation in Colombia, and that where it does have an impact, this is both
temporary and in part due to displacement associated with fumigation efforts, generating
significant human and economic costs. Also, coca cultivation in Colombia tends to occur
in agricultural departments characterised by limited market access and state presence."
(Dion, 2008, pp. 401)
A structural approach to fostering economic growth in Colombia through the
strengthening of local rural economies could have been a less expensive and more
effective strategy to deal with the drugs issue. However, the United States as well as the
Colombian elitist government found an increase in the military response to the armed
conflict a more convenient strategy, repressing the claims for land reform and
anti-neoliberalism instead of addressing the root causes of the conflict. Therefore in 2000
President Clinton signed into law the first installment of Plan Colombia. The economic
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policies implying secure and stable business environment, the liberalisation of capital
markets and the opening of markets to foreign direct investment, "played (and plays) a
central role in the construction and strengthening of this transnational process by linking
policies related to the drug war or the 'promotion of democracy' to the implementation of
free-market economic reforms and the expansion of international trade" (Aviles, 2008,
pp.415). Aviles develops the term "transnational state" to talk about an international elite
who support the same model of economic market through neoliberal policies throughout
the global South. In this sense, Plan Colombia would not only open up investment for the
U.S. market, but also benefit international investors.
This economic integration has a high price for the peasants and people living in
the rural areas that are most affected by this conflict. The long term consequences of this
type of system would be a repetition of the cycle of structural violence that caused the
engagement of peasants in illicit crops production. It is the neoliberal economic policy
that forces peasants to engage in the production of illicit crops to gain their subsistence
due to the unequal conditions that they would have to confront in the global market. The
underlying issue behind coca production is the necessity of the peasants to find means of
sustenance in response to their exclusion from the neoliberal system. "Strengthened
actors in Colombia that have promoted the neoliberal economic direction of the economy,
and that have repressed civic and armed anti-capitalist globalisation movements" (Aviles,
2008, pp. 426) use Plan Colombia as a strategy to further Colombia's economic
incorporation into global markets, while the drug war tried to create the conditions that
would favor this incorporation.
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This suggests that the oligarchic interests of Colombia that are tied to the
neoliberalist ideals are key to understanding the post-conflict economic context. One of
the main tools of neoliberalism to penetrate the Colombian economy are the free trade
agreements pushed mainly by the United States. "Uribe Velez's government adopted a
policy of ensuring the conditions for "investor confidence," which consisted of showing
an improvement in security conditions in order to attract foreign investment." (Chambers,
2017, pp.128) Therefore, under the assumption that economic growth could only be
achieved through a national security approach, in 2006 the Colombian government signed
a preliminary free trade agreement. As mentioned before, a strictly neoliberal approach to
the political economy of the conflict can turn out to be countetproductive. "The social
and economic disaster caused by neoliberalism requires us to recognize the interrelation
between economic and social rights and civil and political rights." (Chambers, 2017,
pp.129).
The civil rights of people regarding increased income generating activities, more
opportunity for competition and a wide market for small producers to sell their products,
overrode the social and economic rights of the peasant populations to benefit from the
public investment that neoliberalism discourages. The human rights discourse that
accompanies neoliberalism in Colombia is relevant since the transnational cotporations
"need to accumulate what Emi calls "rights assets" in the international community
through investment in humanitarian projects. This allows them to have the "externalities"
associated with their economic activity balanced by their investment in human rights"
(Chambers, 2017, pp.134). This is one of the reasons why given the lack of intervention
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of the state in the economy, some of these human rights responsibilities that the state
should be complying with, are transferred to these transnational companies. In this sense
the provision of human rights to the people has become a rhetorical tool of foreign actors'
intervention into rural economies, since said intervention would be associated with the
development of the region. The presence of the multinational companies brings the
promise of generating jobs and stimulating the economy. However, reality does not
reflect this development. In fact, "neoliberalism exposes the post-conflict individual,
community and state to the full force of a market framework in which they are unable to
compete, and often unable to access" (Richmond, 2014, pp.453) Chambers brings an
important contribution to this discussion, and that is that the link between economic
growth and fulfilment of basic needs linked to human rights is undeniable.
What makes a difference is which human rights are prioritized and how those
should be addressed, i.e., individual rights (including property) vs. collective (economic
and social) rights. "From a socialist and liberationist position, human rights discourse has
been criticized for its liberal origins and for concealing capitalist exploitation ... or they
constitute, therefore, the beginnings of an awareness of struggle, of the search for better
conditions for the full satisfaction of human needs." (Chambers, 2007, pp. 135).
Richmond proposed an interesting approach to dealing with the market system in the
post-conflict context. He argues in favor of a "A social-democratic and welfare-oriented
state, in which redistribution occurs through local taxation and international subvention,
may be more suitable for post- conflict transitions, as long as this can include local
(subaltern) rather than international (governmental) decision making. It would need to be

1 00

assisted by internationals, and eventually give way to a contextually determined polity"
(Richmond, 2014, pp.464)
Siegel notes that the future for post conflict societies does not necessarily have to
be bound by neoliberalism, but can also be adapted to a "neo-extractivist approach"
where resources are still extracted but not in the traditional neoliberal oriented way. "It
combines old practices of natural resource exploitation with new social policies and a
stronger role of the state. In this model, income generated from export-led growth based
on primary products has become the basis for economic and social development" (Seigel,
2016, pp.496). In this sense, to avoid the inequalities of an extensive extractivist
economy dominated by foreign actors taking unilateral decisions, neo-extractivism
proposes a type of extractive enterprise that implies a constant dialogue with the people
in the rural areas. "Citizens and civil society organizations do not necessarily advocate a
complete stop to all resource exploitation, but rather demand a say in the location and
extent of particular projects, as well as mitigation of negative impacts and a fair
distribution of the burdens and bene-fits of intensive resource exploitation." (Siegel,
2016, 498). Some see neo-extractivism not as an alternative to neoliberalism, but rather
as a transitional stage towards a more inclusive economic system regarding minorities,
small landowners and peasants. Colombia is a resource-rich country. Equatorial-tropical
countries "are countries very rich in natural resources, and they may even be receiving
significant quantities of cash revenue, but they have not managed to lay the foundations
for their own development and they continue to be poor"(Acosta, 2013, pp.71). The
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presence of natural resources is not the issue. The issue is where the accumulation of the
wealth generated by these extractive enterprises go to.
Neo-extractivism proposes that a democratic approach to the economy through
local participation in the areas of resource extraction talces place could be a valuable
contribution to fighting the inequalities that hinder development and stability in the rural
areas of Colombia. "Casting a vote in elections every few years should thus not be the
only way citizens can participate. This is particularly important in relation to two types of
decisions; those directly affecting citizens' environments and livelihoods; and those
regarding central debates affecting society as a whole" ( Siegel, 2017, pp.503). A
participatory economic development approach seems to be more compatible with the
inclusiveness in the economic policy decisions as well as the peasants' participation in
the market.
Neo-extractivism may involve interactions with the local communities, but there
are no substantive changes in the current structure of accumulation. Thus,
neo-extractivism maintains "involvement in the international market in a subordinate
position that serves the globalisation" of transnational capitalism''( Acosta, 2013, pp.72).
The main critique to neo-extractivism that it fails to address is that the issue is not about
extracting the natural resources, the issue is about who controls them. Whether or not the
local communities have a say and are supported by the government in terms of how the
extractive economic activities are performed, the underlying issue remains the same:
Colombia's extractive activities are still determined according the foreign actor's
demand. The underlying global economic system still rules the means of production
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regardless of how the production is handled. Given the prioritization of extractive
economic activities as a source of capital to "finance development," Acosta argues in his
critique of neo-extractivism that "societies will have to bear the costs of this complex and
conflictive relationship between communities, companies and the state. Local
development plans will be placed at risk, because mining or oil extractivism will take
precedence over any other activity. In the end, the plans drawn up in a participatory way
and with informed consent by the local community will be tom to shreds" (Acosta, 2013,
pp. 74).
In a state like Colombia, allowing rural areas to take a role in the economic
decisions affecting them causes an endogenous opportunity of growth in the post-conflict
context, assuming that the environment to engage in productive economic activities is
safe from violence, is a significantly less expensive approach than to solve the symptoms
of inequality through militarized approaches like the war on drugs. However, without a
more inclusive character, where local communities don't just provide for the economic
system in place but rather have the autonomy to shape it, this

approach creates

conditions for a failure of the "guarantees for non-repetition" point in the peace accord's
agenda; since peasants are restrained from the only profitable economic activity they can
engage in, while leaving unaddressed the underlying social issues that engaged them in
illicit crop production in the first place, as described in the previous chapter. The situation
in Tumaco can be an example of the materialization of this logic. Removal of the crops
without a sustainable alternative in which the people have a say, will bring no benefit to
the locals.
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Grassroots Peace as a Holistic Alternative to Neo/ibera/ism.
Thinking of the development of rural areas, and the fulfilment of the short term goals
supported by the points of the peace accords that affect rural areas, is a complex question.
This is due to the fact that to a great extent the Colombian government, weakened by the
conflict and biased towards the interests of the political elites, never developed the
appropriate rural infrastructure and legal institutions to extend basic services such as
electricity, drinkable water, education, healthcare and a proper administration of lands.
The period of time that has passed since the peace accord was signed shows the
continuing lack of capacity by the Colombian state to provide these basic services that
need to be addressed to guarantee the proper return of the victims to their lands; the
economic prosperity of the rural agrarian sector; and the encouragement of a political
culture that will welcome the peaceful reintegration of the ex-guerrilla members to
civilian life, so that they do not need to find a way to sustain themselves by going back to
their weapons. Economic growth framed in terms of GDP does not necessarily produce
better living conditions and services for the population, and many cities with rapid
economic growth over long periods still have large sections of their population living in
extreme poverty. "The unwillingness of those in power to address this is also evident, as
is the lack of competence, capacity and accountability among most of the city and
municipal governments that have had the main responsibility for addressing growing
levels of deprivation" (Mitlin, 2007, pp.485).
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However the reluctance or lack of capacity of the state to act in the interests of the
poor rural populations of the country can be addressed by the local affected populations
through a non-state dependent active engagement in their communities. Given the evident
lack of fulfillment of the transitional justice elements in Colombia's rural areas (truth,
justice, reparation, reintegration and guarantees of non repetition) it is important that
steps are taken somehow to avoid returning to a conflict. It is clear that a different
economic policy than neo-extractivism in the long term would benefit the overall growth
of the country, however, steps can be taken further to ensure the engagement of all sectors
of society in the peacebuilding process. Former UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali's approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding can be complemented by
letting the affected populations lead the process and assert their role as self-sufficient
economic actors, rather than through international aid and governmental compliance with
the peace accords.
This is where grassroots peace can be helpful to provide the rural areas the
resources that they need in order to settle the post-conflict instability, regardless of the
state's intervention. Ehrlich defines grassroots peacebuilding as "The locally led actions
to reconstruct, recuperate, or rebuild collective goods destroyed during a civil
war"(Ehrlich, 2017, pp.4) The grassroots approach that he proposes aims to build upon
the " lack of trust, depleted social networks, and no informal institutional legacy make it
very difficult for the community to organize around grassroots peacebuilding." (Ehrlich,
2017, Pp. 5) He advocates, like Siegel, including the local people in the development of
international programs that will affect them. An internal approach is necessary, since
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exogenous actors only provide useful short term help while security conditions are
settled. Only locals can implement and build their communities, if the state fails to fulfill
their duties, once international support is gone. Such is the case of the Guatemalan
grassroots-led NGO Desgua. In the midst of the economic neoliberal policies that
followed the peace accords, the rural Guatemalan communities decided to organize
themselves in a self-sustainable, self-reliant way so that they took advantage of their local
resources to fight the adoption of neoliberalism as their economic system. In the case of
Colombia, different communities have found ways to strive for autonomy since they
don •t have a supportive state to fulfill their needs; examples of this will be discussed
below.
••within the context of grassroots peacebuilding, local actions are conceptualized.
organized, resourced and carried out by the ordinary people who were impacted by local
dynamics of irregular warfare in a civil war.. ( Ehrlich, 2017, pp. 25) In fact, ••successful
post war peacebuilding requires a strong international presence at the local level. a
meaningful engagement with local actors, and sustained commitment of resources and
personnel" (Ehrlich, 2017, pp.33). Peacebuilding should take place at all levels of the
nation-state. In this sense for example, in the case of transitional justice, there is no point
in lobbying for laws regarding land and reparations of victims in the higher courts of the
country, when local peasants often fail to exercise their legal claims through these legal
frameworks. This is due to the fact that the system that connects the source of justice (the
legal system) and the rural people is crippled, resulting in claims that are filled but never
addressed, legal processes that take so long to process claims that they end up passing
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the dates of their validity. The crippled legal system requires large mobilizations such as
the 2017 Paro Civico, which prevented the main port of the nation from functioning, to
bring attention from the Colombian government to the rural areas' claims and show
attempts to properly address them.
There is a clear distinction between the legal frameworks provided and their
application in the field. "An ordinary person living in a rural area probably never came in
contact with high level commanders, yet might have to interact with a lower-level
demobilized combatant in his or her neighborhood on a daily basis." (Ehrlich, 2017, pp.
51 ). Such is the case of the community of Puente Madero, the "humanitarian space" of
Buenaventura's port, where they are supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the Law of
Victims which is supposed to grant them protection and means of subsistence as well as a
legitimate right to own their lands. Enrique Chimoja, the special envoy of the Catholic
NGO "Justicia y Paz" described the reason why the rural populations cannot use the law
to their benefit: Even when this law is in place, the community is not getting the full
protection that this law entitles them to, due to their lack of knowledge of the legal
framework they are protected by, the lack of knowledge about the legal system's
processes that allows them to demand accountability if the law is breached, and the lack
of security measures due to the lack of compliance from the military forces protecting the
area to keep paramilitaries away.
When analyzing the potential solutions of the conflict and effective measures to
achieve it, even though it is tempting to want to exclude the private sector completely as
well as invent solutions that reduce the role of weak dysfunctional states, it is important
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to recognize the unavoidable interdependence of the latter and the rural communities.
One could argue that blaming the Colombian government completely for the lack of
compliance with the peace treaty is based on unrealistic expectations. Besides corruption
and a strong link between political elites and the private sector, part of the reason why the
implementation of the peace accords has stalled is due to the historical structures linked
to political atomization, high levels of intervention from the United States, and the way
the legal and civil institutions have historically been shaped to function in favor of the
elites. A peace accord may address the solution to the conflict, but not the transversal
historical institutions and internal dynamics of the government such as corruption,
clientelism, and a systematically biased legal system. A state with deeply crippled
institutions during the conflict cannot be expected to function as an integral entity in the
immediate post-conflict context. Part of the post-conflict strategy should be focused on
rebuilding the governmental institutions of the country, while at the same time
strengthening civil society by empowering the development of the less advantaged areas
through cooperation between these populations and the private sector.
This type of cooperation has to correspond to the needs of the stakeholders whose
interests are most directly affected in the post-conflict context. Each actor should take an
autonomous initiative towards its contribution to long-term stability. In this sense, the
government should focus on strengthening its institutions to guarantee accountability and
extend civil rights to the population, so it can be ready to fully comply with its role of
providing security, re-distributing and protecting new agrarian institutions and reshaping
the responsiveness of the legal system to the claims of less advantaged people. Not doing
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so can result in outcomes similar to the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, where the
government remained embedded in the same repressive and corrupt structures in the
post-conflict context, being unable to respect the rights of the people. At the same time,
the civil society must break the stigma of the ex-combatant, as well as organize
themselves in function of advocating peacefully for the changes it wishes to see in the
post-conflict period. The rebuilding of the society must be shaped around strengthening
"cultures of peace." These are defined by the United Nations as "set of values, attitudes,
modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling
their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals
groups and nations." (UN International Day of Peace day, 2018). In this sense, all the
polarized views of the settlement of the conflict that led to the outcome of the failed 2016
referendum, and the social and political divides preventing Colombia from strengthening
a national sentiment leading to a strong democratic culture, could be tackled by seeking
to build a Colombian culture of peace.
The private sector on the other hand must adapt itself to the new context where
the rights of the civilian rural populations are respected, and incorporate a civil and social
rights approach to its extractive activities. It is clear that the functionality of the conflict
has changed for all actors involved and the stabilization of the country is necessary,
therefore only through the compromise and joint effort of all stakeholders can there be an
overall beneficial solution.
An example of the type of civic initiative that is conducive to peace is the
Community of San Carlos in the department of Antioquia. The voluntary return of the
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internally displaced people of this area included the development of a holistic approach
towards making the village habitable again. The locals developed strategies to remove
landmines, "they organized to remove landmines from unpaved roads, agricultural fields,
and around schools so that they could resume their livelihood and help other displaced
people return. Residents removed landmines by hand" {Eirich, 2017, pp.49). They
repaired the infrastructure such as schools and road damaged in the conflict, as well as
repairing the buildings and re-establishing the institutions in charge of providing basic
services. In the economic sector, locals can rebuild the economy of the village by starting
small local enterprises to stimulate the economy of the region. Also, "a locale might
establish a community-owned 'peace' store that provides subsidies to farmers who grow
crops that are not conflict-oriented {coca, for example) and sells them in the store. The
community store may also follow a 'peace protocol' that prohibits the sale of goods or
services to anyone in uniform, as a means to remain neutral and civilian-based." {Eirich,
2017, pp.55). The locals also promoted a movement towards reincorporating the
demobilized combatants into civilian life. Once the community of San Carlos started
these development projects that were led by the locals, it was a lot easier for the state to
provide the help needed, since it didn't have to worry about the administrative tasks. The
civic engagement of the San Carlos community advanced "further, and to the federal
government's credit, it gleaned best practices that would be incorporated into the national
Victims Law." {Eirich, 2017, pp. 61)
In terms of grassroots organizations, it is possible to see local initiatives from
different ethnic sectors in Colombia that claim recognition of their rights. The most
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salient of these entities is the "Ethnic Chapter" represented by a coalition of
Afro-Colombian communities, and its participation in the development of the peace
accords since 2012. It explored the "critiques of capitalist accumulation and alternatives
to development based on distinct productive relations coming up against the ravages of
both the internal armed conflict and a dominant development model, both expressive of
class relations. These alternatives to development-expressed through new discourses of
"Buen Vivir,U "Sumak Kawsay," and "Ubuntu" -have been fundamental to the survival
of these communities.''(Gruner, 2017, pp.175).
It is vital to understand the vulnerabilities and interests of different groups and the
relationship of their organization as a civil group, as well as their capability to voice to
the government and the international community their needs, instead of letting these two
actors impose and develop solutions for them. Solutions must be community led and
context specific and the role of the NGOs, IGOs and the Colombian state should be to
facilitate instead of imposing one-sided solutions. We see the variation of struggles that
different populations in Colombia are facing: "The Black and Indigenous population
living in or near another important port city on the Colombian Pacific coast,
Buenaventura experiences endemic poverty; it is also the site of troubling violence and,
particularly,of violence against women, which has taken on brutal dimensions... Other
regions made vulnerable to violence related to development include Northern Cauca,
where large-scale legal and illegal mining and other extractive projects are located; el
Choco province--also rife with mining, petroleum, illicit crop production and other
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interests; southern Putumayo region, areas along the Caribbean coast, and the border with
Venezuela."(Gruner, 2017, pp.179)
However, it is important to utilize all the strategic resources available in order to
maximize outcomes and enable the economic resources to provide for the specific needs
of the different communities. This type of economic financing can be not only provided
through state grants and development programs, but if well used, the private sector can
contribute to these tasks. In order for this to happen, it is necessary for the Colombian
state to act as guarantor in favor of the local interests to make sure that the rights of the
people are not being violated by transnational or private economic activities. The lack of
economic opportunities has become evident in the post-conflict context, along with the
negative consequences of not realizing the potential of the private sector to generate jobs
and contribute to the society. In fact, "part of the demobilised population has joined a
number of new illegal armed groups, which from 2006 to 2012 saw more than 11,500 of
their members arrested. Of these, nearly 15 percent were demobilised combatants"
(Those11, 2013, pp.180). In this sense, it is understandable where the neoliberal argument
for economic reintegration through private sector activities is relevant. However, the
context for economic neoliberal growth in states weakened by armed conflict may be
counterproductive to achieving peace, due to the lack of accountability that the
government can provide to prevent the potential abuse and exploitation by TNCs.
Therefore, Thorsen argues that "in the absence of strong state and local capacity, the
private sector and civil society can provide supporting and sometimes substituting roles,
especially in implementation of DDR programming."(Thorsell, 2013, pp.185). The
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implications of an unregulated private sector sponsored by neoliberal policies could be
addressed by establishing a stable post war context where the extractive economic
activities are not only inclusive of the rural populations, but where the economic policy
of the country is dictated based on the empowerment of local rural communities. This
implies a full implementation of the Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR), rather than an
imposition of the global market logic in the systems of rural production, even if it
includes the refrarning of the role the transnational corporations play in extracting and
controlling Colombia's natural resources. The approach the government must take to
achieve economic growth must be measured in terms of the wellbeing of its population
and the purchasing power of the domestic consumers, rather than the amount of foreign
investment capital. Then it is possible to establish a new relationship between economic
capital and social capital, where weaJth could be measured in terms of a Human
Development Index instead of a GDP approach. In this way, the overall economic
growth is going to be led from the domestic society, rather than imposed by external
economic actors such as the United States or TNCs.

Conclusion

Conflict-resolution strategies such as the traditional UN peacebuilding, the
democratic peace, the war on drugs and transitional justice do a good job addressing
isolated variables that relate to the causes of the structural violence. However, addressing
structural violence requires a significant change in the structures that allowed for conflict
to happen and that these causes are not usually isolated. In the case of Colombia, this
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leaves the unattended areas of society in a vacuum that can be filled by the remaining
armed actors, such as the BACRJM or new anned forces like the "Autodefensas
Gaitanistas de Colombia" or Gaitanist Self-defense Forces of Colombia, which are a "neo
paramilitary" group that is also engaged in drug trafficking. This group has been a rival
of the FARC and the ELN and has refused to participate in any peace process while it
also has put efforts to occupy the power vacuum left by the demobilized guerrilla groups.
There are still members of the other armed group of Colombia, the ELN (which has not
yet signed a peace accord) as the actor that can establish a base of power through the
regional monopoly of coercive forces. The focus on transitional justice only, or a political
economy approach only may leave out factors that concern the civil society such as the
poor quality of living of the people of Choco, Buenaventura, Tumaco, Putumayo and
Northern Cauca. That makes it difficult to apply all the terms of the Colombian peace
accord effectively. In this sense it is important to recognize that there has to be a buy-in
consensus at all the levels of society in the political, economic and social aspects of the
reconstruction of the post-conflict context.
It is evident how cooperation among all stakeholders can be achieved through a
holistic approach that transcends purely the role of the state. Peacebuilding needs to be
thought of as a continuous collective process rather than a single political task from the
government. It is important to recognize the role that every single actor that has a stake in
Colombia's peace accords. They should participate in its implementation to guarantee
their optimal satisfaction with the post-conflict status quo, due to the functionality and
profitability that peace may bring them. In this sense, solutions must come from those
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who were historically affected by the conflict (the victims and populations in the rural
areas) and its underlying structures, as well as the interests of those actors who
perpetrated the repetition of the cycles of structural violence such as the state and the
transnational private sector. This means that grassroots movements shaped by local civic
engagement, such as the one in the San Carlos community or the local communities of
Buenaventura that organized the paro civico in May of 2017, have a decisive role in
shaping the direction in which policy making should go at the higher levels of the state.
Local community agency combined with a responsive state, together with a regulated
private sector, would provide the necessary support for all the areas that peacebuilding
could encompass in order for it to hold a share of all the interests of the actors involved.
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